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ABSTRACT	  
	  
The	  effect	  of	  prison	  conditions	  and	  discretionary	  parole	  on	   inmate	  behavior	  and	  crime	  rates	   is	  
examined.	  	  Evidence	  suggests	  that	  prison	  conditions	  and	  crime	  rates	  are	  positively	  related,	  and	  
that	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  discretionary	  parole	  leads	  to	  lower	  crime	  rates,	  but	  possibly	  higher	  levels	  
of	  inmate	  misconduct.	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  
Crime	   in	   the	  United	   States	   declined	   across	   the	   board	   in	   the	   1990s,	   to	   the	   surprise	   of	  
many.	  	  Levitt1	  stresses	  just	  how	  unexpected	  the	  decline	  was:	  
“Having	   just	   lived	   through	   an	   enormous	   reduction	   in	   crime	   [in	   the	   early	  
1990s],	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  reconstruct	  just	  how	  unexpected	  such	  a	  decline	  really	  
was.	   	  Even	  after	  the	  fall	  had	  begun,	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  prominent	  
criminologists	  dismissed	  the	  decline	  as	  a	  transitory	  blip	  that	  would	  quickly	  
be	  reversed.”	  
Many	   criminologists	   believe	   that	   demographics	   are	   the	   overriding	   determinants2	  of	  
crime	   rates.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   economists	   believe	   that	   crime,	   like	   all	   human	   activity,	   is	  
affected	   by	   the	   associated	   costs	   and	   benefits.	   	   Recent	   economic	   research	   suggests	   that	  
increasing	  incarceration	  rates3	  are	  responsible	  for	  much	  of	  the	  decline	  in	  crime	  that	  began	  in	  the	  
early	  1990s.	  
This	  study	  examines	  how	  various	   institutions	  affect	   the	  cost	  of	  crime	  and	  punishment.	  	  
Chapter	   I	   examines	   the	   possible	   impact	   of	   prison	   conditions	   on	   inmates’	   overall	   utility	   levels	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  (Levitt,	  Understanding	  Why	  Crime	  Fell	  in	  the	  1990s:	  Four	  Factors	  that	  Explain	  the	  Decline	  and	  Six	  that	  Do	  
Not	  2004)	  
2	  James	  Q.	  Wilson	  (1995,	  p.	  507)	  wrote,	  “Just	  beyond	  the	  horizon,	  there	  lurks	  a	  cloud	  that	  the	  winds	  will	  
soon	  bring	  over	  us.	  The	  population	  will	  start	  getting	  younger	  again	  .	  .	  .	  .Get	  ready.”	  
John	  DiIulio	  (1996,	  p.	  8)	  wrote,	  “It	  is	  not	  inconceivable	  that	  the	  demographic	  surge	  of	  the	  next	  10	  years	  
will	  bring	  with	  it	  young	  male	  criminals	  who	  make	  the	  .	  .	  .	  Bloods	  and	  Crips	  look	  tame	  by	  comparison.”	  
Also	  see	  (Fox	  1996).	  
3	  Many	  studies	  find	  this,	  such	  as	  (Levitt,	  Understanding	  Why	  Crime	  Fell	  in	  the	  1990s:	  Four	  Factors	  that	  
Explain	  the	  Decline	  and	  Six	  that	  Do	  Not	  2004),	  (Marvell	  and	  Moody,	  Prison	  Population	  Growth	  and	  Crime	  
Reduction	  1994),	  (Levitt,	  The	  Effect	  of	  Prison	  Population	  Size	  on	  Crime	  Rates:	  Evidence	  from	  Prison	  
Overcrowding	  Litigation	  1996)	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using	  voluntary	  parole	  waivers	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  prison	  life.	  	  Chapter	  II	  also	  
examines	  the	  effect	  of	  prison	  conditions	  –	  this	  time	  on	  the	  long-­‐run	  effect	  on	  various	  measures	  
of	  crime.	  	  Chapter	  III	  studies	  the	  effects	  of	  two	  recent	  sentencing	  reforms	  –	  truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	  
and	   sentencing	   guidelines—on	   crime	   rates.	   	   	   Chapter	   IV	   examines	   the	   determinants	   of	  
misconduct	  in	  prisons,	  and	  attempts	  to	  determine	  whether	  truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	  reforms	  studied	  
in	  chapter	  III	  have	  change	  the	  incentives	  of	  inmate	  misconduct.	  
Literature	  Review	  
Background	  
Becker	  (1968)	  formally	  extended	  rational-­‐choice	  theory	  to	  criminal	  behavior,	  but	  he	  was	  
not	  the	  first	  to	  apply	  the	  principles	  of	  economics	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  crime	  and	  crime	  prevention.	  	  
Adam	   Smith	   (1776)	   argued	   that	   crime	   and	   the	   demand	   for	   protection	   from	   crime	   are	   both	  
motivated	  by	  the	  accumulation	  of	  property.	   	   Jeremy	  Bentham	  (1789)	   [1843]	  wrote	  that	  “…the	  
profit	   of	   crime	   is	   that	   force	  which	   urges	  man	   to	   delinquency:	   	   the	   pain	   of	   punishment	   is	   the	  
force	  employed	  to	  restrain	  him	  from	  it.	  	  If	  the	  first	  of	  these	  forces	  be	  the	  greater,	  the	  crime	  will	  
be	  committed;	   if	   the	  second,	   the	  crime	  will	  not	  be	  committed.”	   	  Tullock	   (1971)	  observed	   that	  
many	  of	  the	  reforms	  to	  criminal	  law	  suggested	  by	  Bentham	  had	  only	  recently	  gained	  traction	  in	  
the	  legal	  community	  at	  the	  time	  he	  wrote.	  
Becker	   argued	   that	   criminal	   activity	   is	   rational,	   self-­‐interested	   behavior	   that	   can	   be	  
modeled	   within	   the	   constrained	   optimization	   framework.	   	   In	   such	   a	   world	   the	   concept	   of	  
deterrence	   is	   central:	   	   Criminals	  will	   commit	   fewer	   crimes	  when	   the	  expected	   cost	   associated	  
with	  crime	  goes	  up.	  	  Becker	  noted	  that	  expected	  punishment	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  
apprehension	  and	  conviction,	  along	  with	  the	  severity	  of	  punishment	  (most	  often	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	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fine	  or	  imprisonment,	  or	  both).	  	  Becker	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  crime	  is	  non-­‐zero;	  
preventing	  crime	  is	  costly,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  worth	  preventing	  a	  unit	  of	  crime	  if	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  
to	  society	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  associated	  marginal	  cost.	  
Stigler	   (1970)	   expanded	   on	   Becker’s	   propositions	   about	   the	   rational	   enforcement	   of	  
laws.	   	   He	   argued	   that	   rational	   enforcement	   of	   laws	   must	   have	   these	   two	   properties:	   	   1)	  
expected	  penalties	   increase	  with	  expected	  gains,	   so	   there	   is	   no	  marginal	   net	   gain	   from	   larger	  
offenses;	  and	  2)	  expenditure	  on	  crime	  prevention	  generates	  a	  reduction	  in	  crime,	  at	  the	  margin,	  
equal	   to	   the	  return	  on	  these	  resources	   in	  other	  areas.	   	  This	   idea	  of	   the	  necessity	  of	  “marginal	  
deterrence”	  suggests	  that	  many	  “sentence	  enhancements”	  of	  the	  type	  imposed	  today	  may	  not	  
be	  optimal.	  
Tullock	  (1971)	  analyzed	  the	  optimality	  of	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  maximizing	  the	  
net	   gain	   associated	   with	   protection	   of	   private	   property.	   	   He	   argued	   that	   fines	   cannot	   be	   a	  
solution	   to	   thefts	  because	   real-­‐life	   criminals	   are	   insolvent,	   and	   therefore	  direct	   costs	  must	  be	  
imposed	  on	  the	  thief.	  	  The	  cost	  imposed	  on	  the	  thief	  should	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  damages,	  and	  the	  
damages	  should	  be	  a	   function	  of	   the	  probability	   that	   the	  police	  solve	  the	  crime.	   	  Thus,	  crimes	  
that	  are	  more	  costly	  to	  detect	  should	  trigger	  stiffer	  penalties.	  
Tullock	  contended	  that	  the	  imperfect	  control	  over	  the	  courts	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  observed	  
association	  of	  declining	  conviction	  rates	  with	  an	  increasing	  severity	  of	  sentences.	  	  If	  courts	  were	  
organized	  so	  that	  they	  carried	  out	  the	  law	  as	  it	  was	  given	  to	  them,	  no	  problem	  would	  arise.	  	  If,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  courts	  followed	  their	  own	  ethical	  standards	  rather	  than	  the	  law,	  then	  this	  
fact	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  drawing	  up	  the	  basic	  law.	  	  Tullock’s	  argument	  may	  explain	  
the	   rise	   of	   legislatively	   imposed	   sentence	   enhancements	   and	   determinate	   sentencing:	   	   If	   the	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courts	  do	  not	  enforce	  the	  law	  as	  it	  is	  written,	  legislatures	  may	  be	  moved	  to	  restrict	  the	  courts’	  
independence.	  
Tullock	  also	  commented	  on	  criminals’	  expectation	  of	  punishment	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  prison	  
conditions	  and	  deterrence,	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  sensible	  to	  exaggerate	  the	  unpleasantness	  of	  prison	  
life.	   	  Thus,	  when	  a	  new	  prison	  opens,	  the	  officials	  might	  well	  make	  statements	  to	  the	  press	  to	  
the	  effect	  that	  it	  would	  be	  an	  awful	  place	  in	  which	  to	  be	  incarcerated	  instead	  of	  pointing	  out	  its	  
“humane”	  features.	  
Ehrlich	   (1973)	  modeled	  a	   criminal’s	   choice	  of	   the	   allocation	  of	   his	   time	  between	   legal	  
and	   illegal	   activities.	   	   He	   stated	   that	   concurrent	   offense	   imprisonment	   terms	   for	   multiple	  
offenses	  create	  an	  incentive	  for	  offenders	  to	  specialize	  in	  illegitimate	  activities	  because	  they	  do	  
not	   bear	   the	   full	   cost	   of	   allocating	   additional	   time	   to	   those	   activities.	   	   	   Additionally,	   Ehrlich’s	  
model	  suggested	  that	  specialization	   in	   illegitimate	  activities	   is	  a	   function	  of	   risk	  preference.	   	  A	  
risk-­‐neutral	  offender	  will	  spend	  more	  time	  in	  illegitimate	  activities	  than	  will	  a	  risk	  avoider,	  and	  a	  
risk	  seeker	  will	  spend	  more	  time	  in	  illegitimate	  activities	  relative	  to	  both.	  	  Ehrlich	  also	  noted	  that	  
offenders	   with	   legitimate	   labor	   market	   wages	   well	   below	   the	   median	   in	   their	   areas	   have	   a	  
greater	  differential	  return	  from	  property	  crimes	  and,	  therefore	  a	  greater	  incentive	  to	  engage	  in	  
such	  criminal	  activity.	  
Overview	  of	  the	  Empirical	  Literature	  on	  Crime	  
Much	  of	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  crime	  consists	  of	  empirical	  tests	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  incarceration	  in	  reducing	  crime	  rates,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  welfare	  implications	  of	  incarcerating	  the	  
marginal	  and	  the	  average	  prisoner.	   	   Incarceration	  has	  two	  distinct	  components	  that	  can	  affect	  
crime:	  	  incapacitation	  and	  deterrence.	  	  Incapacitation	  can	  reduce	  crime	  because	  the	  criminal	  is	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locked	  up,	  and	  so	  is	  unable	  to	  commit	  crimes	  (except	  against	  other	  inmates).	  	  Deterrence	  refers	  
to	  the	  change	  in	  behavior	  of	  a	  criminal	  in	  response	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  being	  locked	  up.	  
DiIulio	  and	  Piehl	  (1991)	  found	  that	  the	  number	  of	  crimes	  committed	  by	  criminals	  is	  very	  
positively	   skewed.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   median	   prisoner	   in	   Wisconsin	   reports	   involvement	   in	  
twelve	  non-­‐related	  crimes	  per	  year	  when	  not	  imprisoned,	  while	  the	  mean	  self-­‐reported	  figure	  is	  
141.	   	   	   	   Piehl	   and	   DiIulio	   (1995)	   find	   that	   the	   cost-­‐benefit	   calculations	   suggest	   that	   the	   social	  
benefits	  of	  incarcerating	  the	  median	  and	  mean	  prisoner	  outweigh	  the	  social	  costs,	  but	  the	  cost	  
of	  imprisoning	  the	  bottom	  quartile	  of	  inmates	  outweighs	  the	  social	  benefits.	  
Marvell	  and	  Moody	  (1994)	  used	  state-­‐level	  panel	  data	  of	  49	  states’	   incarceration	  rates	  
from	  1971	  to	  1989	  to	  estimate	  the	  elasticity	  of	  crime	  with	  respect	  to	  incarceration	  rates.	  	  They	  
estimated	   that	   about	   17	   crimes	   (mainly	   property	   crimes)	   were	   averted	   for	   each	   additional	  
prisoner	  put	  behind	  bars.	  
Levitt	   (1996)	   suggested	   that	   because	   of	   the	   endogeneity	   between	   crime	   and	  
imprisonment,	   studies	   such	   as	   Marvell	   and	   Moody	   (1994)	   understate	   the	   true	   impact	   of	  
imprisonment	  on	  crime.	   	  A	  simultaneity	  bias	  exists	  because	   increased	   incarceration	   is	   likely	   to	  
reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  crime,	  but	  increases	  in	  crime	  will	  translate	  into	  larger	  prison	  populations.	  	  
Therefore,	   OLS	   estimates	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   prisons	   on	   crime	   rates	   are	   likely	   to	   understate	   the	  
magnitude	   of	   the	   effect,	   perhaps	   substantially.	   	   Levitt	   used	   overcrowding	   litigation	   as	   an	  
instrument	  for	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prison	  population	  in	  order	  to	  attempt	  to	  correct	  for	  simultaneity	  
bias,	   because	   presumably	   overcrowding	   litigation	   is	   correlated	  with	   prison	   populations	   but	   is	  
otherwise	  not	  correlated	  with	  crime	  rates.	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Prior	  to	  instrumenting,	  Levitt	  obtained	  estimates	  that	  are	  slightly	  smaller	  than	  those	  in	  
past	  research:	  elasticities	  of	  crime	  with	  respect	  to	  prisoner	  populations	  of	  approximately	  -­‐0.10.	  	  
His	  IV	  estimates	  are	  much	  larger:	  -­‐0.40	  for	  violent	  crime	  and	  for	  -­‐.30	  for	  property	  crime.	  	  Levitt’s	  
results	   suggest	   that	   each	  prisoner	   released	  as	   a	   result	  of	  overcrowding	   litigation	   is	   associated	  
with	   an	   extra	   fifteen	   crimes	  per	   year,	   almost	   exactly	   the	   self-­‐reported	   criminal	   activity	   of	   the	  
median	  prisoner	  in	  DiIulio	  and	  Piehl	  (1991).	  	  Using	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  crime	  to	  victims	  
in	   Cohen	   (1988)	   and	  Miller,	   Cohen,	   and	   Rossman	   (1993),	   the	  marginal	   social	   benefit	   in	   crime	  
reduction	  of	  adding	  one	  prisoner	   for	  one	  year	  can	  be	  estimated	  to	  be	  approximately	  $50,000,	  
while	  the	  annual	  marginal	  costs	  of	  incarceration	  are	  roughly	  $30,000	  per	  prisoner.	  
In	  a	  study	  using	  national	  data	  from	  1930	  to	  1994,	  Marvell	  and	  Moody	  (1997)	  found	  that	  
a	  10	  percent	  increase	  in	  the	  total	  prison	  population	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  13	  percent	  decrease	  
in	  homicide,	  after	  controlling	  for	  socioeconomic	  factors.	  	  Raphael	  and	  Stoll	  (2004)	  analyzed	  the	  
relationship	   between	   prisoner	   releases	   and	   state	   crime	   rates	   from	   1977	   to	   1999.	   Increased	  
prisoner	  releases	  were	  associated	  with	   increased	  murder,	   rape,	   robbery,	  burglary,	  and	   larceny	  
rates.	  	  Spelman	  (2000)	  estimated	  that	  the	  drop	  in	  crime	  during	  the	  1990s	  would	  have	  been	  27	  to	  
34	   percent	   smaller	   without	   the	   prison	   buildup.	   	   Spelman	   (2005)	   analyzed	   the	   impact	   of	  
incarceration	   in	   Texas	   counties	   from	   1990	   to	   2000,	   finding	   that	   the	   most	   significant	   factor	  
responsible	  for	  the	  drop	  in	  crime	  in	  Texas	  was	  the	  state's	  prison	  expansion.	  
Johnson	  and	  Raphael	  (2006)	  measured	  the	  effect	  of	  aggregate	  changes	  in	  incarceration	  
on	   changes	   in	   crime,	   accounting	   for	   the	   potential	   simultaneous	   relationship	   between	  
incarceration	  and	  crime.	  They	  developed	  an	  instrument	  for	  future	  changes	  in	  incarceration	  rates	  
based	  on	   the	   theoretically	   predicted	   dynamic	   adjustment	   path	   of	   the	   aggregate	   incarceration	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rate	  in	  response	  to	  a	  shock	  to	  prison	  entrance-­‐or-­‐exit	  transition	  probabilities.	  	  Using	  state-­‐level	  
data	   for	   the	  United	  States	  covering	   the	  period	   from	  1978	  to	  2004,	   they	   find	  that	  crime-­‐prison	  
elasticities	   are	   considerably	   larger	   than	   those	   implied	   by	   OLS	   estimates.	   For	   the	   entire	   time	  
period,	   average	   crime-­‐prison	   effects	   have	   implied	   elasticities	   of	   between	   -­‐0.06	   and	   -­‐0.11	   for	  
violent	  crime	  and	  between	  -­‐0.15	  and	  -­‐0.21	  for	  property	  crime.	  	  	  They	  also	  presented	  the	  results	  
for	   two	  sub-­‐periods	  of	   their	  panel:	  1978	  to	  1990	  and	  1991	  to	  2004.	  Their	   IV	  estimates	   for	   the	  
earlier	  period	  suggest	  much	  larger	  crime-­‐prison	  effects,	  consistent	  with	  Levitt	  (1996).	  	  The	  latter	  
period	  revealed	  much	  less	  of	  an	  effect.	  
Levitt	  (2004)	  reviewed	  the	  facts	  on	  crime.	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  all	  categories	  of	  crime	  decline	  in	  
all	  parts	  of	   the	  United	  States.	   	  Homicide	   rates	   fell	  43	  percent	   from	  the	  peak	  of	  1991	   to	  2001,	  
reaching	  the	  lowest	  level	  in	  35	  years.	  	  Over	  the	  same	  time	  period,	  the	  FBI’s	  violent	  crime	  index	  
fell	  34	  percent,	  while	  property	  crime	  index	  fell	  29	  percent.	  	  Levitt	  notes	  that	  the	  leading	  experts	  
were	  predicting	  an	  explosion	  in	  crime	  in	  the	  early	  and	  mid-­‐1990s,	  exactly	  the	  time	  when	  crime	  
rates	  began	  to	  plunge.	  	  Levitt	  claims	  that	  most	  of	  the	  popular	  explanations	  on	  why	  crime	  rates	  
fell,	  such	  as	  innovative	  policing	  strategies,	  played	  little	  direct	  roles	  in	  the	  decline.	  
Barclay,	  Tavares,	  and	  Siddique	  (2001)	  compared	  crime	  trends	  in	  the	  United	  States	  versus	  
the	  European	  Union.	   	   They	  estimated	   that	  homicide	   rates	   fell	  4	  percent	  on	  average	   in	   the	  EU	  
between	  1995	  and	  1999,	  while	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  homicide	  rates	  fell	  28	  percent.	  	  They	  also	  estimated	  
that	  violent	  crime	  rose	  11	  percent	  on	  average	  in	  the	  EU	  over	  the	  same	  time	  period,	  compared	  to	  
a	  20	  percent	  growth	  rate	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
Of	   the	   factors	   Levitt	  dismissed,	  one	   is	   the	  effect	  of	   the	   strong	  economy	  of	   the	  1990s.	  
Numerous	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  observed	  2%	  decline	  in	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  can	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account	  for	  an	  estimated	  2%	  decline	  in	  property	  crime,	  but	  it	  cannot	  account	  for	  any	  change	  in	  
violent	  crime.	  	  Levitt	  suggested	  that	  demographic	  shifts	  account	  for	  about	  one-­‐sixth	  sixth	  of	  the	  
observed	  decline	  in	  property	  crimes	  in	  the	  1990s,	  but	  very	  little	  of	  the	  decline	  in	  violent	  crimes.	  	  
He	  argued	  that	  the	  notion	  that	  better	  policing	  strategies	  reduce	  crime	  has	  little	  or	  no	  empirical	  
support.	   	   Levitt	   also	  dismisses	   the	   roles	  of	   changing	  gun-­‐control	   laws,	  whether	   those	   changes	  
resulted	  in	  more	  stringent	  gun	  control	  laws	  or	  permitted	  the	  carrying	  of	  concealed	  weapons.	  	  	  
Levitt	  argues	  that	   increases	   in	  the	  number	  of	  police	  did	  have	  a	  major	   impact	  on	  crime	  
reduction	  and	  quotes	  Marvel	  and	  Moody	  (1996),	  who	  found	  the	  estimated	  elasticities	  of	  crime	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  number	  of	  police	  to	  be	  approximately	   .30.	   	  Levitt	   (2002)	  obtained	  an	  even	  
higher	  estimate	  when	  he	  used	  the	  number	  of	  firefighters	  as	  an	  instrument.	  	  He	  contended	  that	  
the	  increase	  in	  police	  between	  1991	  and	  2001	  can	  explain	  between	  one-­‐fifth	  and	  one-­‐tenth	  of	  
the	   overall	   decline	   in	   crime,	   and	   that	   the	   investment	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   attractive	   from	  a	  
cost-­‐benefit	  perspective.	  
Using	  an	  estimate	  of	  elasticity	  of	  crime	  with	  respect	  to	  punishment	  of	  -­‐.30	  for	  homicide	  
and	  violent	  crime	  and	  -­‐.20	  for	  property	  crime,	  Levitt	  concludes	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  incarceration	  
over	  the	  1990s	  accounted	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  crime	  of	  approximately	  12	  percent	  for	  the	  first	  two	  
categories	   and	   8	   percent	   for	   property	   crime,	   or	   about	   one-­‐third	   of	   the	   observed	   decline	   in	  
crime.	  
Levitt	  contends	  that	  the	  receding	  crack	  epidemic	  explains	  about	  15	  percent	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  
homicide,	  but	  very	   little	  of	  the	  decline	   in	  other	  categories	  of	  crime.	   	  Also,	  Levitt	  contends	  that	  
legalized	   abortion	   is	   associated	   with	   a	   10	   percent	   reduction	   in	   homicide,	   violent	   crime,	   and	  
property	  crime,	  which	  would	  account	  for	  25-­‐30	  percent	  of	  the	  observed	  decline	  in	  the	  1990s.	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Sentence	  Enhancements	  and	  the	  Measurement	  of	  Deterrence	  
Sentence	   enhancements	   are	   additional	   penalties	   imposed	   on	   offenders	   for	   serious	  
crimes.	  	  Sentence	  enhancements	  include	  such	  innovations	  as	  three-­‐strikes	  laws,	  repeat-­‐offender	  
enhancements,	  and	  truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	  laws.	  	  Sentence	  enhancements	  have	  been	  implemented	  
in	   some	   form	   in	   virtually	   every	   state.	   	   From	   an	   economist’s	   point	   of	   view,	   sentence	  
enhancements	   are	   problematic.	   	   First,	   sentence	   enhancements	   appear	   to	   violate	   Stigler’s	  
proposition	   that	   rational	   punishment	   requires	   additional	   deterrence	   for	   more	   severe	   crimes.	  	  
Such	  marginal	  deterrence	  is	  often	  eliminated	  with	  sentence	  enhancements,	  since	  a	  third	  felony,	  
regardless	   of	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   felony,	   can	   result	   in	   enhanced	   sentences,	   thereby	   possibly	  
creating	  an	  incentive	  for	  a	  criminal	  to	  increase	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  crime.	  
In	   addition	   to	   economists’	   objections	   to	   sentence	   enhancements,	   critics	   have	   argued	  
that	   given	   the	   relatively	   short	   length	   of	   criminals’	   careers	   (about	   10	   years	   on	   average4),	  
incapacitating	   offenders	   beyond	   the	   standard	   sentence	   length	   has	   little	   effect	   on	   reducing	  
crime.	  
Keeping	   in	  mind	  the	  theoretical	  objections	  to	  sentence	  enhancements,	   is	   it	  possible	  to	  
develop	   countervailing	   arguments	   in	   support	   of	   sentence	   enhancements?	   	   Friedman	   and	  
Sjostrom	  (1993)	  argue	  that	  more	  severe	  punishments	  for	  more	  serious	  offenses	  are	  a	  necessary	  
condition	  for	  efficient	  crime	  prevention	  only	  with	  additional	  assumptions,	  the	  main	  one	  is	  that	  
the	  cost	  function	  for	  apprehending	  and	  convicting	  offenders	  is	  the	  same	  for	  all	  of	  the	  alternative	  
offenses	  being	  considered.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  (Blumstein,	  et	  al.	  1986),	  p.	  92	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Sentence	   enhancements	   provide	   an	   empirical	   test	   of	   the	   deterrence-­‐versus-­‐	  
incapacitation	  effect	  of	  incarceration,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short-­‐run.	  	  A	  fall	  in	  crime	  rates	  that	  occurs	  
in	   response	   to	   the	   enactment	   of	   sentence	   enhancements	   suggests	   that	   the	   deterrent	   effect	  
dominates	   the	   incapacitation	   effect.	   	   When	   simply	   looking	   at	   incarceration	   rates	   and	   crime	  
rates,	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   break	   down	   the	   effect	   into	   a	   distinct	   incapacitation	   and	   deterrent	  
effect.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  empirically	  that	  a	  deterrent	  effect	  exists.	  
McCormick	   and	   Tollison	   (1984)	   present	   one	   of	   the	   first	   empirical	   tests	   of	   deterrence	  
versus	  incapacitation.	  	  They	  analyze	  the	  effect	  adding	  an	  additional	  referee	  on	  the	  frequency	  of	  
fouls	   committed	   in	   college	   basketball	   games,	   finding	   a	   decline	   in	   the	   number	   of	   fouls	  
committed.	  Given	  that	  no	  incapacitation	  exists,	  the	  results	  measure	  the	  pure	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  
increased	  policing.	  
Kessler	   and	   Levitt	   (1999)	   analyze	   the	   outcome	   of	   California’s	   Proposition	   184,	   which	  
requires	  courts	  to	   lengthen	  the	  sentence	  of	  repeat	  offenders	   in	  cases	   involving	  violent	  crimes.	  
They	   find	   that	   longer	   sentences	   have	   tended	   to	   reduce	   crime.	   	   Within	   three	   years,	   crimes	  
covered	   by	   the	   law	   fell	   an	   estimated	   8	   percent.	   	   Seven	   years	   after	   the	   change	   in	   law,	   these	  
crimes	  were	  down	  20	  percent.	  
Shepherd	  (2002a)	  argues	  that	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  three-­‐strikes	  laws	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  
the	  third	  strike,	  and	  that	  studies	  that	  only	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  third	  strike	  underestimate	  
the	  full	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  the	  legislation.	  
Shepherd	   (2002b)	  explores	   the	   impact	  of	   truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	   (TIS)	   legislation	  on	  police	  
prosecutors	   and	   criminals.	   	   TIS	   laws	   require	   violent	   offenders	   to	   serve	   at	   least	   85	   percent	   of	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their	   prison	   sentence.	   	   Prior	   to	   the	   1970s,	   criminal	   punishment	   was	   based	   on	   a	   system	   of	  
indeterminate	  sentencing.	  	  Judges	  and	  parole	  boards	  jointly	  determined	  the	  actual	  time	  served	  
by	   offenders.	   	   Shepherd	   argues	   that	   long	   sentences	   have	   little	   incapacitation	   effect	   because	  
prisoners	  remain	  in	  jail	  past	  the	  time	  at	  which	  they	  would	  have	  stopped	  offending	  (according	  to	  
age-­‐profiles	   of	   criminal	   activity).	   	   However,	   even	   if	   determinate	   sentencing	   produces	   few	  
benefits	  through	  incapacitation,	  it	  could	  still	  have	  a	  large	  deterrence	  effect.	  	  One	  of	  the	  primary	  
goals	  of	   Shepherd’s	  paper	   is	   to	  determine	   the	  magnitude	  of	   the	  deterrence	  effect.	   	   Shepherd	  
finds	   that	   that	   TIS	   laws	   deter	   offenders	   from	   committing	   violent	   crimes,	   but	   that	   these	  
defenders	   substitute	   in	   property	   crimes	   instead.	   	   Shepherd	   also	   finds	   that	   TIS	   laws	   cause	  
maximum	  prison	   sentences	   to	   increase,	   because	  more	  offenders	   choose	   trials	   instead	  of	   plea	  
bargains.	  
CHAPTER	  ONE:	  	   VOLUNTARY	  PAROLE	  WAIVERS	  AND	  PRISON	  
CONDITIONS	  
	  
Over	  the	  two-­‐year	  period	  2004-­‐2005,	  over	  10	  percent	  of	   inmates	   in	  the	  26	  states	  for	  which	  data	  could	  be	  obtained	  
waived	  their	  right	  to	  a	  parole	  hearing.	  	  What	  can	  explain	  the	  voluntary	  decision	  to	  remain	  incarcerated?	  	  This	  paper	  




With	   the	   exception	   of	   Katz,	   Levitt	   and	   Shustorovich	   (2003),	   the	   current	   literature	  
assumes	  that	  the	  length	  of	  a	  prison	  sentence	  captures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  convicted	  criminal	  
“pays”	  for	  a	  crime.1	  	  This	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  prison	  conditions	  do	  not	  vary	  from	  jurisdiction	  
to	  jurisdiction.	   	   If	  this	  is	  not	  true,	  then	  the	  length	  of	  a	  prison	  sentence	  alone	  is	  not	  a	  complete	  
indicator	  of	  punishment.	   	  Anecdotal	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  some	  prisons	  may	  no	   longer	  be	  as	  
unpleasant	  as	  we	  thought:	  
Donal	   Kelleher,	   37,	   an	   inmate	   at	   HMP	   Cardiff,	   said	   that	   his	   en	   suite	  
accommodation	  was	  "outstanding"	  and	  disclosed	  that	  he	  was	  paid	  £10	  a	  
week	   –	   to	   study	   for	   a	   maths	   GCSE	   –	   which	   he	   spends	   on	   cigarettes,	  
chocolate	  and	  "other	  luxury	  goods".	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Mustard	  (2003)	  finds	  a	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  conviction	  rates	  per	  se,	  presumably	  indicating	  a	  “fixed	  cost”	  
component	  of	  a	  prison	  sentence.	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A	  prison	  officer	  who	  has	  worked	  at	  Cardiff	  for	  15	  years	  said	  last	  week	  that	  
inmates	  were	  simply	  sitting	  in	  their	  cells	  watching	  snooker	  on	  television	  or	  
playing	  computer	  games.	  	  
He	  added	  that	  a	  new	  health	  care	  centre	  put	  local	  hospitals	  "to	  shame"	  and	  
made	   it	   easier	   to	   see	   a	   dentist	   than	  on	   the	   "outside".	   The	   extraordinary	  
claims	   were	   made	   after	   The	   Daily	   Telegraph	   disclosed	   last	   week	   that	   a	  
prison	   officers'	   leader	   said	   jails	   had	   become	   so	   comfortable	   that	   some	  
inmates	  were	  ignoring	  chances	  to	  escape.2	  
	  Additional	   anecdotal	   evidence	   also	   suggests	   that	   some	   inmates	   prefer	   prison	   to	   life	  
outside	  prison.3	  	  Although	  none	  of	  these	  anecdotes	  is	  from	  U.S.	  prisons,	  nonetheless	  they	  raise	  
the	   clear	   possibility	   that	   prison	   conditions	   affect	   the	   cost-­‐benefit	   calculation	   of	   engaging	   in	  
criminal	  activity.	  
If	   prison	   conditions	   do	   matter	   to	   inmates,	   then	   variation	   in	   prison	   conditions	   across	  
states	   can	   have	   important	   public-­‐policy	   implications,	   most	   notably	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  sentence	  enhancements	  as	  a	  policy	  instrument.	  	  [Sentence	  enhancements	  refer	  
to	  additional	  prison	  time	  being	  added	  on	  the	  sentence	  for	  particular	  types	  of	  convictions,	  most	  
often	   for	   offenders	   who	   have	   previous	   convictions,	   and	   are	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   “three	  
strikes”	   laws.]	   	  Sentence	  enhancements	   in	   the	  short	   run	  rely	  purely	  on	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Story from Telegraph News: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1904584/Inmate-boasts-of-
%27luxury%27-life-in-prison.html.   
 
3	  Twenty-­‐three-­‐year-­‐old	  Detlef	  Federsohn	  was	  recently	  released	  from	  the	  Josefstadt	  prison	  in	  the	  Austrian	  capital	  
Vienna	  after	  he	  was	  incarcerated	  for	  two	  years	  because	  of	  theft.	  	  However,	  he	  was	  arrested	  again	  last	  week	  after	  he	  
was	  caught	  on	  the	  roof	  of	  the	  said	  prison	  trying	  to	  break	  in	  "and	  blend	  with	  the	  inmates."	  	  Federsohn	  said	  "Life	  is	  so	  
much	  easier	  on	  the	  inside.	  They	  feed	  you,	  do	  your	  washing	  and	  let	  you	  watch	  TV,	  which	  I	  can	  tell	  you	  is	  a	  lot	  more	  
than	  my	  mom	  does.	  So	  I	  thought	  if	  I	  could	  sneak	  back	  in	  I	  would	  blend	  in	  with	  the	  others	  and	  the	  guards	  wouldn't	  
notice."	  	  Source:	  	  http://www.wayodd.com/ex-­‐convict-­‐tries-­‐to-­‐break-­‐into-­‐prison/v/3848/	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incarceration,	  because	   the	  offender	  would	  have	  already	  been	   incapacitated	  with	   the	   standard	  
sentence.	  	  This	  idea	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	  
Deterrent	  Effect	  of	  Prison	  Conditions	  
This	  paper	  attempts	  to	  estimate	  the	  effect	  of	  prison	  conditions	  on	  parole	  waiver	  rates	  
across	   states	   of	   the	  U.S.	   	   The	   relationship	   between	  prison	   conditions	   and	   deterrence	   has	   not	  
been	   studied	   extensively	   in	   economics,	   most	   likely	   due	   to	   data	   limitations	   about	   prison	  
conditions.	  	  Katz,	  Levitt,	  and	  Shustorovich	  (2003)	  (henceforth	  KLS)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  papers	  that	  
examines	  the	  impact	  of	  prison	  conditions	  on	  crime	  rates.	  
KLS	  contend	   that	  given	   the	  high	  discount	   rate	  of	   criminals	  and	   the	   low	  execution	   rate	  
(compared	  to	  accident	  rates,	  and	  specifically	  accident	  or	  death	  rates	  for	  criminal	  behavior),	  it	  is	  
unlikely	  that	  capital	  punishment	  would	  be	  effective.	  	  KLS	  reveal	  that	  the	  execution	  rate	  on	  death	  
row	   is	  only	   twice	   the	  death	  rate	   from	  accidents	  and	  violence	  among	  all	  American	  men,	  and	   is	  
approximately	   the	   same	   as	   for	   black	   males	   between	   the	   ages	   of	   15	   and	   34	   in	   the	   general	  
population.	   	  Among	  the	  criminal	  subpopulation,	  death	  rates	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  much	  higher	   than	  
for	  those	  on	  death	  row.	  
KLS	  argue	  that	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  in	  prisons	  may	  be	  a	  far	  more	  important	  factor	  on	  
criminal	  behavior	  than	  the	  death	  penalty.	  The	  lower	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  in	  prison,	  the	  greater	  will	  
be	  the	  punishment	  for	  a	  given	  prison	  sentence,	  which	  suggests	  that	  poor	  prison	  conditions	  are	  
likely	  to	  deter	  crime.	  	  Unlike	  capital	  punishment,	  prison	  conditions	  affect	  all	  inmates,	  regardless	  
of	   the	   crime	   committed.	   	   Also,	   knowledge	   of	   prison	   conditions	   among	   potential	   offenders	   is	  
likely	  to	  be	  accurate,	  either	  because	  of	  personal	  experience	  or	  that	  of	  acquaintances.	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KLS	  contend	  that	  the	  prison	  death	  rate	  is	  the	  best	  proxy	  for	  prison	  conditions,	  and	  that	  it	  
is	  likely	  that	  prison	  death	  rates	  correlate	  with	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  unpleasantness	  of	  the	  prison	  
experience.	   	   KLS	   suggest	   inadequate	   health	   care	   in	   prison	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   the	  most	   important	  
factor	   in	   determining	   death	   rates	   among	  prisoners.	   	   KLS	   do	   not	   use	   health	   care	   expenditures	  
because	  those	  data	  not	  consistently	  available.	   	  After	  controlling	  for	  relevant	  factors,	  KLS	  find	  a	  
strong	  and	  robust	  negative	  relationship	  between	  prison	  death	  rates	  and	  subsequent	  crime	  rates	  
in	  a	  state.	   	  KLS	  contend	  that	   the	  magnitude	  of	   the	  relationship	   is	   too	   large	   to	  attribute	   to	   the	  
fact	   that	   a	   prisoner	   who	   dies	   will	   never	   be	   released	   (thereby	   lowering	   the	   overall	   pool	   of	  
criminals).	  	  Therefore,	  KLS	  interpret	  the	  results	  as	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  deterrence.	  
The	   rest	   of	   this	   chapter	   extends	   the	   KLS	   analysis	   by	   directly	   estimating	   the	   effect	   of	  
prison	  conditions	  on	  inmates’	  welfare,	  using	  the	  frequency	  of	  parole	  waivers	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  
the	  relative	  unpleasantness	  of	  prison	  life.	  
Model	  
Inmates	  weigh	  the	  expected	  benefit	  and	  cost	  of	  remaining	  incarcerated.	  	  An	  inmate	  will	  
waive	  his	  right	  to	  a	  parole	  hearing	  if	  the	  expected	  benefit	  exceeds	  the	  expected	  cost.	  
An	  inmate’s	  decision	  to	  waive	  parole	  is	  modeled	  as	  a	  binary	  choice,	  represented	  by	  the	  
variable	  𝑦!,	   where	  𝑦! = 1	  if	   the	   inmate	  waives	   parole	   and	  𝑦! 	  =	   0	   otherwise.	   	   The	   inmate’s	   net	  
benefit,	  𝑦!∗,	  is	  an	  unobservable,	  continuous	  function	  of	  observable	  factors	  and	  a	  inmate-­‐specific	  
unobservable	  factor:	  
𝑦!∗ = 𝑓 𝑥 +   𝑢! 	  	  
The	  inmate’s	  decision	  to	  waive	  parole	  is	  therefore:	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𝑦! = 1  𝑖𝑓𝑦!∗ > 0	  	  
𝑦! = 0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒	  	   	   	  
Data	  and	  Estimation	  
Estimation	  procedure	  
I	   estimate	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   parole-­‐waiver	   choice	   a	   weighted	   least	   squares	   logit	  
regression	  for	  grouped	  data.	  	  Because	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  constructed	  from	  grouped	  data	  
(the	  total	  number	  of	  waivers	  per	  state	  divided	  by	  the	  total	  number	  of	  parole-­‐eligible	  inmates	  per	  
state)	  from	  groups	  of	  equal	  size,	  the	  standard	  assumption	  of	  constant	  variance	  is	  violated.	  	  This	  
estimation	   procedure	   accounts	   for	   the	   different-­‐sized	   denominators,	   therefore	   correcting	   for	  
heteroscedasticity.	  	  	  
Empirical	  Model	    logit(𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑉𝐸!) = 𝛽! +𝛽!𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐸! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑉𝐺𝐷𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸! +𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐻! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐼𝑇! + 𝜖!,	  
where	   j	   indexes	   states,	  PERINMATE	   is	   state	  expenditure	  per	   inmate,	   INCOME	   is	   state	   income,	  
AVGDRATE	  is	  the	  average	  death	  rate	  in	  prison	  over	  the	  three	  year	  period	  2001-­‐2004,	  SOUTH	  is	  
dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  a	  state	  is	  located	  in	  the	  south,	  and	  LIT	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  
indicating	   whether	   the	   state	   faced	   overcrowding	   litigation.	   	   The	   waiver	   data	   (WAIVE)	   were	  
collected	  from	  departments	  of	  corrections	  and	  parole	  boards	  of	  states.	  	  Table	  1.1	  lists	  the	  states	  
involved	   in	   the	   sample.	   	   The	   waiver	   rate	   ranges	   from	   less	   than	   one	   percent	   in	   Arkansas,	  
Kentucky,	  and	  Louisiana,	  to	  around	  35	  percent	  in,	  and	  Massachusetts,	  Montana	  and	  Wyoming.	  	  
The	  mean	  rate	  is	  about	  10.6	  percent.	  	  The	  weighted	  mean	  rate	  is	  around	  8.4	  percent.	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Explanation	  of	  Independent	  Variables	  
PERINMATE	  
This	  variable	  refers	  to	  the	  annual	  expenditures	  per	  inmate	  for	  states	  as	  calculated	  by	  the	  
U.S.	  Department	   of	   Justice	   and	   includes	   both	   capital	   and	  operating	   expenses.	   Theoretically,	   a	  
positive	  relationship	  between	  per	  inmate	  expenditures	  and	  the	  waiver	  rate	  should	  exist,	  as	  the	  
marginal	   disutility	   associated	   with	   being	   incarcerated	   would	   decrease	   with	   additional	   prison	  
amenities.	   	   For	   2001,	   Alabama	   spends	   the	   least	   on	   prisons,	   at	   $8128,	   and	  Maine	   spends	   the	  
most	  at	  just	  over	  $44,379.	  	  The	  mean	  for	  all	  fifty	  states	  is	  $24,053.	  
INCOME	  
Income	   data	   is	   per	   capita	   state	   income	   as	  measured	   by	   the	  U.S.	   Bureau	   of	   Economic	  
Analysis.	  	  Theoretically,	  the	  level	  of	  state	  income	  matters	  because	  the	  return	  to	  criminal	  activity	  
is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  income	  and	  wealth	  of	  a	  jurisdiction.	  	  The	  expected	  sign	  on	  the	  level	  of	  state	  
income	   is	   negative.	   	   In	   rich	   states,	   all	   other	   things	   equal,	   criminals	   can	   earn	   higher	   returns.	  	  
When	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  remaining	  in	  prison	  is	  higher,	  fewer	  inmates	  will	  choose	  to	  waive	  
parole	  hearings.	  
AVGDRATE	  
Death	  rate	  per	  prisoner	  is	  another	  indicator	  of	  prison	  conditions.4	  	  The	  expected	  sign	  on	  
this	   variable	   should	   be	   negative.	   	   Inmates	   will	   not	   wish	   to	   remain	   incarcerated	   if	   prison	  
conditions	  are	  bad.	  
Data	  on	  prison	  deaths	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice.5	  	  	  An	  average	  
death	   rate	   was	   calculated	   over	   the	   five-­‐year	   period	   from	   2001-­‐2005.	   	   The	   death	   rate	   ranges	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  (Katz,	  Levitt	  and	  Shustorovich	  2003)	  
5	  Bureau	  of	  Justice	  Statistics,	  Deaths	  in	  Custody	  Statistical	  Tables,	  Table	  7.	  	  Available:	  	  
http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcrp/prisonindex.htm	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from	  about	  a	  half-­‐percent	  in	  North	  Dakota	  to	  about	  1.8	  percent	  in	  Pennsylvania.	  	  The	  mean	  for	  
all	  fifty	  states	  is	  about	  1.15	  percent.	  
LIT	  
This	   is	   an	  overcrowding	   litigation	  dummy,6	  and	   is	   used	   to	  estimate	  whether	   there	  has	  
been	  a	  long-­‐run	  effect	  on	  court	  involvement	  on	  the	  oversight	  of	  prisons.	  	  A	  value	  of	  1	  indicates	  
that	  there	  has	  been	  court-­‐ordered	  oversight	  of	  a	  state’s	  prison	  system.	  
SOUTH	  
The	   South	   is	   commonly	   perceived	   as	   imposing	   harsher	   punishments	   on	   criminal	  
behavior	  than	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  country.7	  	  This	  dummy	  variable	  was	   included	  to	  attempt	  to	  
estimate	  whether	  these	  perceptions	  are	  true.	  
Results	  
Results	   from	   the	   regression	   are	   reported	   in	   Table	   1.5.	   	   Specifications	   (1)	   and	   (2)	   use	  
observations	  from	  all	  26	  states	  from	  which	  data	  were	  obtained.	   	  Specifications	  (3),	  (4),	  and	  (5)	  
do	   not	   include	   states	   for	   which	   parole	   waiver	   frequencies	   were	   estimated	   by	   government	  
officials	  in	  response	  to	  my	  queries.	  
The	  results	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  expenditure	  per	  inmate	  is	  a	  key	  determinant	  in	  waiver	  
rates.	  	  	  The	  coefficient	  on	  per	  inmate	  expenditure	  is	  positive	  and	  significant	  for	  all	  specifications.	  	  
An	   increase	   in	   per	   inmate	   expenditure	   of	   $1,000	   would	   increase	   the	   percentage	   of	   inmates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Levitt	  (1996)	  
7	  Borg	  (1997)	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waiving	  their	  parole	  hearing	  rights	  by	  anywhere	  from	  0.3	  percentage	  points	  to	  one	  percentage	  
point,8	  depending	  on	  the	  specification.9	  	  
The	   coefficient	  on	  per	   capita	   state	   income	  suggests	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  waiver	   rates,	  
and	   was	   statistically	   significant	   for	   specifications	   that	   do	   not	   use	   estimated	   values.	   	   The	  
estimated	   marginal	   effect	   of	   $1,000	   in	   per	   capita	   state	   income	   on	   the	   waiver	   rate	   varies	  
significantly,	  from	  -­‐.1%	  to	  approximately	  -­‐1%.	  	  
The	  coefficient	  on	  the	  average	  death	  rate	  in	  prison	  does	  not	  have	  a	  consistent	  sign,	  but	  
is	  negatively	   statistically	   significant	  at	   the	  10%	   level	   for	  one	  specification.	   	   In	   the	  specification	  
that	   was	   statistically	   significant,	   the	   marginal	   effect	   was	   approximately	   a	   decline	   of	   one	  
percentage	  point	  in	  the	  waiver	  rate	  for	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  the	  prison	  death	  rate.	  
Both	   of	   the	   dummy	   variables	   are	   statistically	   significant	   at	   the	   5%	   level	   in	   both	  
specifications.	  	  The	  SOUTH	  dummy	  is	  negatively	  related	  to	  waiver	  rates,	  and	  the	  marginal	  effect	  
between	  approximately	  4	  percentage	  points	  and	  8	  percentage	  points.	   	  This	  also	  represents	  an	  
additive	   effect,	   which	   suggests	   that	   states	   in	   the	   south,	   all	   else	   equal,	   have	   a	   waiver	   rate	  
between	  4%	  and	  8%	   lower	  than	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  country,	  which	   is	  quite	  relative	  to	  the	  average	  
waiver	  rate	  of	  approximately	  10%,	  and	  lower	  than	  that	  if	  a	  population	  weighted	  average	  is	  used.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  mfx	  compute,	  predict(p)	  dydx	  at(mean)	  procedure	  in	  Stata	  10	  was	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  marginal	  
effects	  from	  the	  glogit	  regressions	  	  The	  marginal	  effects	  with	  respected	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  waiver	  are	  
calculated	  by	  multiplying	  the	  parameter	  estimate	  by	  p(1-­‐p)*mean	  of	  the	  independent	  variable	  in	  
question.	  
9	  	  This	  increase	  represents	  an	  additive	  increase,	  not	  a	  percent	  change.	  	  Example:	  	  If	  originally	  5%	  of	  
inmates	  were	  waiving	  their	  parole	  hearings,	  after	  the	  $1,000	  increase	  in	  per	  inmate	  expenditures,	  the	  
predicted	  value	  would	  be	  5.3%	  to	  6%	  of	  inmates	  waiving	  their	  parole	  hearings,	  depending	  on	  the	  
specification.	  	  All	  reported	  marginal	  effects	  for	  this	  chapter	  will	  use	  this	  same	  terminology.	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The	  overcrowding	  litigation	  dummy	  (LIT)	  is	  positive	  and	  significant	  in	  both	  specifications,	  
with	   an	   extremely	   large	   marginal	   effect	   of	   over	   15	   percentage	   points	   in	   both	   specifications,	  
indicating	   that	   states	   facing	   overcrowding	   litigation	   had	   much	   higher	   rates	   of	   inmate	   parole	  
waivers.	   	   This	   is	   a	   somewhat	   surprising	   result,	   suggesting	   that	   states	   may	   have	   dramatically	  
improved	  conditions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  court	  action.	  
The	  results	   for	   the	  two	  dummy	  variables	  should	  be	   interpreted	  with	  caution	  given	  the	  
small	  overall	   sample	   size,	  and	   the	  even	   smaller	   subset	  of	   states	  matching	   the	   specific	  dummy	  
criterion.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
The	  regression	  results	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  variation	  in	  prison	  conditions	  across	  
states	   is	   an	   important	   determinant	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   parole	   waiver	   rates.	   	   The	   estimated	  
positive	   effect	   of	   per	   inmate	   expenditure	   on	   parole	   waivers	   is	   a	   key	   explanatory	   variable	   is	  
robust	   in	   each	   specification.	   Other	   interesting	   results	   include	   the	   statistical	   significance	   of	  
SOUTH	  and	  LIT.	  	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  prison	  life	  is	  worse	  in	  the	  South,	  even	  after	  controlling	  
for	   the	  smaller	  per	   inmate	  expenditures	   in	   the	  South.	   	  Additionally,	   the	  significance	  of	   the	  LIT	  
variable	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  some	  long-­‐term	  improvement	  in	  prison	  conditions	  if	  the	  system	  is	  
under	  court	  supervision.	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Table	  1.1	  	  Waiver	  Rate	  from	  States	  with	  Data	  Massachusetts	   0.3570	  Montana	   0.3560	  Wyoming	   0.3402	  Nebraska	   0.2994	  Arizona	   0.2464	  Oklahoma	   0.2322	  South	  Carolina	   0.1786	  Missouri	   0.1760	  Pennsylvania	   0.0918	  New	  Hampshire*	  	   0.0833	  Tennessee	   0.0832	  Colorado	   0.0816	  Virginia	   0.0560	  Idaho	   0.0413	  Nevada*	   0.0354	  Connecticut	   0.0255	  Alabama	   0.0145	  New	  Jersey	   0.0132	  Maryland	   0.0118	  Hawaii*	   0.0108	  North	  Dakota	   0.0089	  Arkansas	   0.0042	  Mississippi*	   0.0039	  Louisiana	   0.0018	  Iowa*	   0.0009	  Kentucky	   0.0006	  
Note:	  	  *	  denotes	  an	  estimated	  value	  by	  state	  authorities.	  
	  
	  
Table	  1.2	  	  States	  facing	  overcrowding	  litigation	  Alabama	  Alaska	  Arkansas	  Delaware	  Florida	  Mississippi	  New	  Mexico	  Oklahoma	  Rhode	  Island	  South	  Carolina	  Tennessee	  Texas	  
Source:	  	  (Levitt,	  The	  Effect	  of	  Prison	  Population	  Size	  on	  Crime	  Rates:	  Evidence	  from	  Prison	  Overcrowding	  Litigation	  
1996)	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Table	  1.3	  	  States	  classified	  as	  South	  Alabama	  Arkansas	  Florida	  Georgia	  Kentucky	  Louisiana	  Mississippi	  North	  Carolina	  South	  Carolina	  Tennessee	  Virginia	  
	  
Table	  1.4	  	  Summary	  Statistics,	  Waiver	  Data	  
Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  Waiver	  rate	   26	   0.106	   0.124	   0.001	   0.357	  "Yes"	  to	  waiver	  in	  a	  state	   26	   909	   1364	   4	   5466	  Total	  eligible	  in	  a	  state	   26	   12230	   13870	   779	   66292	  State	  per-­‐inmate	  expenditure	   50	   24053	   7914	   8128	   44379	  State	  Income	   50	   33288	   4846	   24664	   47388	  Death	  rate	  in	  prison	  for	  state	   50	   0.0115	   0.0024	   0.0057	   0.0178	  
	  
Table	  1.5	  	  Waiver	  Rate	  as	  Dependent	  Variable	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	  
Per	  inmate	  expenditure	   0.000173	   0.000173	   0.000272	   0.000267	   0.000118	  
	   0.000079	   0.000071	   0.000071	   0.000078	   0.000049	  
	   2.19	   2.44	   3.84	   3.45	   2.42	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
State	  Income	   -­‐0.00007	   -­‐0.00007	   -­‐0.00026	   -­‐0.00021	   	  
	   0.00009	   0.00009	   0.00008	   0.00010	   	  
	   -­‐0.85	   -­‐0.85	   -­‐3.32	   -­‐2.19	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Average	  death	  rate	   63.4	   77.0	   -­‐249.5	   -­‐189.6	   	  
	   137.8	   141.3	   132.9	   162.8	   	  
	   0.46	   0.54	   -­‐1.88	   -­‐1.16	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
South	  dummy	   -­‐2.75	   	   -­‐2.58	   	   	  
	   1.17	   	   0.90	   	   	  
	   -­‐2.34	   	   -­‐2.88	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Overcrowding	  litigation	  dummy	   3.14	   	   2.27	   	   	  
	   1.10	   	   0.89	   	   	  
	   2.86	   	   2.56	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared	   0.317	   0.289	   0.538	   0.362	   0.196	  
N	   26	   26	   21	   21	   21	  
Note:	  Glogit	  routine	  used.	  	  Standard	  errors	  appear	  in	  gray	  italics.	  	  T-­‐stats	  appear	  below	  std.	  errors.	  
CHAPTER	  TWO:	  	   LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECTS	  OF	  PRISON	  CONDITIONS	  ON	  CRIME	  
RATES	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  long-­‐run	  effect	  of	  prison	  conditions	  on	  crime	  rates,	  the	  results	  of	  Katz,	  Levitt,	  and	  
Shustorovich	  (“KLS”)	  are	  replicated	  and	  extended	  through	  the	  year	  2000.	   	  Results	  suggest	  state	  fixed	  effects	  on	  the	  
crime	  rate	  are	  determined	  in	  part	  by	  prison	  conditions.	  
	  
Introduction	  
The	   deterrent	   effect	   of	   a	   given	   prison	   sentence	   is	   typically	   assumed	   to	   be	   solely	   a	  
function	   of	   the	   expected	   length	   of	   the	   prison	   sentence,	  with	   very	   little	   attention	   paid	   to	   the	  
conditions	   of	   incarceration.	   	   Because	   prison	   conditions	   vary	   across	   states,	   the	   effective	  
deterrent	   associated	   with	   a	   given	   prison	   sentence	   may	   be	   larger	   in	   states	   where	   prison	  
conditions	   are	   relatively	   harsh.	   	   Thus,	   states	   with	   harsher	   prison	   conditions	   may	   experience	  
lower	   crime	   rates.	   	   While	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   that	   harsher	   prison	   conditions	   may	   breed	   more	  
hardened	  recidivism,	  that	  question	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  
Much	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  crime	  rates	  across	  states	  can	  be	  explained	  through	  analysis	  of	  
panel	   data	   sets	   if	   the	   relevant	   demographic,	   economic,	   and	   criminal	   justice	   system	   control	  
variables	  are	   included.1	  	   	  The	  estimated	  coefficients	  on	  the	  state-­‐fixed	  effects	   from	  such	  panel	  
data	  can	  be	   interpreted	  as	  measures	  of	  state-­‐specific	  crime	  not	  explained	  by	   the	  crime	  model	  
specification,	   and	  may	   contain	   information	   on	   persistent	   crime	   differences	   across	   states	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  (Katz,	  Levitt	  and	  Shustorovich	  2003)	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result	   from	   long-­‐run	   effects	   of	   various	   factors.	   These	   factors	   may	   include	   prison	   conditions,	  
cultural	  influences,	  and	  other	  state-­‐specific	  variables	  that	  affect	  crime.	  	  This	  paper	  uses	  the	  state	  
fixed-­‐effects	   coefficients	   as	   dependent	   variables	   in	   a	   new	   regression	   that	   uses	   measures	   of	  
prison	   conditions	   as	   independent	   variables	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   determine	   whether	   prison	  
conditions	  can	  help	  explain	  some	  long-­‐run	  differences	  in	  crime	  rates	  across	  the	  states	  of	  the	  U.S.	  	  	  
Data	  and	  Estimation	  
In	  order	  to	  generate	  the	  state	  fixed	  effects,	  the	  study	  of	  Katz,	  Levitt,	  and	  Shustorovich	  
[“KLS”]	  is	  replicated	  over	  a	  larger	  time	  period.	  	  The	  KLS	  study	  encompassed	  the	  years	  1950-­‐1990.	  	  
For	  this	  paper,	  the	  time	  period	  covered	  is	  1950-­‐2000.	  
Empirical	  Model	  
The	  specification	  used	  by	  KLS	  is	  
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐸!" = 𝛽!𝑇𝐼𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐺!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑇𝐻!" + 𝐵!𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑇𝐸!" + Χ!"Γ + 𝜆! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!",	  
where	   s	   indexes	   states	   and	   t	   indexes	   time.	   	  CRIME	   is	   the	   crime	   rate	   per	   100,000	   residents,	  DEATH	   is	   the	   death	   rate	   per	   1,000	   state	   prisoners,	   and	  EXECUTE	   is	   the	   execution	   rate	   per	  
1,000	   state	  prisoners.	   	  Χ	   is	   a	   vector	  of	   criminal	   justice,	  economic,	   and	  demographic	   variables.	  	  
The	  indicator	  variables	  λ	  and	  δ	  represent	  state	  fixed	  effects	  and	  time	  dummies.	  
The	  original	  KLS	  study	  focused	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  DEATH	  and	  EXECUTE	  on	  the	  crime	  rate.	  	  
Data	   on	   crime	   rates	   were	   collected	   from	   the	   Federal	   Bureau	   of	   Investigation’s	   (FBI)	   Uniform	  
Crime	   Report	   (UCR),	   which	   contains	   crimes	   reported	   to	   police.	   	   Rape	  was	   removed	   from	   the	  
violent	  crime	  numbers,	  because	  it	  was	  not	  reported	  over	  the	  entire	  time	  period	  of	  the	  study.	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KLS	  estimate	   their	  model	   for	   three	  different	  crime	  categories	  –	  murder,	  violent	  crime,	  
and	  property	  crime.	  	  I	  use	  the	  coefficients	  on	  the	  state	  fixed	  effects	  from	  three	  crime	  models	  in	  
separate	   specifications. 2 	  	   Measures	   of	   prison	   conditions	   could	   not	   be	   added	   to	   the	   KLS	  
specification	   because	   reliable	   time-­‐series	   data	   are	   not	   available	   over	   the	   full	   sample	   period.	  	  
Instead,	  the	  state	  fixed	  effect	  is	  used	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable	  in	  a	  cross-­‐section	  regression	  with	  
current	   measurements	   of	   prison	   conditions	   as	   the	   independent	   variables.	   	   This	   specification	  
preserves	   the	   variation	   present	   in	   a	   panel	   data	   set,	   but	   it	   allows	   for	   inclusion	   of	   the	   cross-­‐
sectional	  prison-­‐conditions	  variables.	  
The	  following	  specification	  is	  used	  in	  a	  second-­‐stage	  cross-­‐section	  regression:	  
𝑆𝐹𝐸! =   𝜙!𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇! + 𝜙!𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷! + 𝜙!𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑆! + 𝜙!𝐷𝑅𝑈𝐺! + 𝜙!𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇! + 𝜙!𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐻! + 𝜙!𝐿𝐼𝑇! + 𝜖!,	  
where	  s	  indexes	  states.	  	  SFE	  is	  the	  estimated	  value	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  for	  states.	  	  ASSAULT	  is	  the	  
inmate	   assault	   rate	   in	   2000.	   	   SPEND	   is	   annual	   per	   inmate	  expenditures	   for	   2001.	   	  AIDS	   is	   the	  
state	   AIDS	   rate	   in	   2000.	   	   DRUG	   is	   the	   percentage	   of	   inmates	   who	   were	   given	   psychotropic	  
medication	  in	  2000.	  	  	  REPORT	  is	  the	  number	  of	  disciplinary	  reports	  filed	  by	  the	  prison	  authority	  
divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  inmates	  in	  2000.	  	  SOUTH	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  the	  
state	  is	  located	  in	  what	  is	  traditionally	  known	  as	  the	  American	  south.3	  	  LIT	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  
indicating	  whether	  there	  was	  prison-­‐overcrowding	  litigation	  involving	  the	  state.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  KLS	  has	  multiple	  specifications	  for	  each	  type	  of	  crime.	  	  I	  use	  the	  specification	  that	  includes	  all	  control	  
variables	  along	  with	  a	  state	  time	  trend.	  
3	  Insert	  footnote	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Explanation	  of	  Independent	  Variables	  
ASSAULT	  
The	  inmate	  assault	  rate	  is	  included	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  because	  it	  may	  serve	  as	  
an	   indicator	  of	  prison	   conditions.	   	  As	   inmate	  assault	   becomes	  more	   common,	   incarceration	   is	  
likely	  to	  become	  more	  unpleasant	  for	  most	  offenders.	  	  This	  data	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  2000	  
Census	  of	  Adult	  Correctional	  Facilities,	  and	  was	  aggregated	  to	  the	  state	  level.	  
SPEND	  
Per-­‐inmate	  expenditure	  is	  another	  measure	  of	  overall	  prison	  conditions	  within	  a	  state.	  If	  
states	  spend	  little	  on	  their	  prison	  system	  on	  a	  per	  inmate	  basis,	  prison	  conditions	  are	  probably	  
more	   unpleasant.	   	   This	   data	  were	   obtained	   from	   the	   Bureau	   of	   Justice	   Statistics	   for	   the	   year	  
2001.	  
AIDS	  
AIDS	  is	  the	  AIDS	  rate	  per	  100,000	  residents	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  year	  2000.	  	  This	  variable	  
was	   included	   because	   the	   threat	   of	   contracting	   AIDS	   while	   incarcerated	   may	   increase	   the	  
expected	  cost	  of	   incarceration,	   thus	   the	   threat	  of	  AIDS	  may	   function	  as	  a	  deterrent	   for	  crime.	  	  
Effectively,	  this	  variable	  is	  another	  indicator	  of	  prison	  conditions.	  	  The	  statewide	  rate	  was	  used	  
instead	   of	   the	   prison	   rate	   because	   potential	   offenders	   may	   have	   better	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
statewide	  rate	  than	  the	  rate	  within	  the	  prison	  system.	  
DRUG	  
As	  the	  results	  in	  chapter	  four	  suggest	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  effect	  on	  contraband	  seizures	  
on	   staff	   assault	   rates,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   relationship	   between	   inmate	   satisfaction	   and	   the	  
availability	  of	  psychoactive	  drugs.	   	  States	  in	  which	  it	   is	  easy	  for	  inmates	  to	  obtain	  psychotropic	  
drugs	   may	   offer	   a	   relatively	   less	   unpleasant	   prison	   experience.	   	   If	   so,	   then	   this	   variable	   is	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another	  indicator	  of	  prison	  conditions.	  	  This	  data	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  2000	  Census	  of	  Adult	  
Correctional	  Facilities,	  and	  has	  been	  aggregated	  to	  the	  state	  level.	  
REPORT	  
The	  number	  of	  disciplinary	  reports	  for	  inmates	  is	  the	  total	  number	  of	  documented	  cases	  
in	  which	  an	  inmate	  has	  broken	  the	  rules.	  	  This	  value	  is	  divided	  by	  the	  total	  number	  of	  inmates	  to	  
convert	  it	  into	  a	  rate.	  This	  variable	  may	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  how	  strict	  a	  prison	  is.	  	  Some	  inmates	  
may	  prefer	  a	  strict	  prison,	  while	  others	  may	  not.	  	  On	  balance,	  it	  is	  presumed	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  
relationship	   with	   inmates’	   satisfaction.	   	   These	   data	   were	   obtained	   from	   the	   2000	   Census	   of	  
Adult	  Correctional	  Facilities,	  and	  has	  been	  aggregated	  to	  the	  state	  level.	  
SOUTH	  
Results	   reported	   in	   Chapter	   One	   suggest	   that	   prison	   conditions	   in	   the	   South	  may	   be	  
more	  unpleasant	  than	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	   	   If	  so,	  this	  fact	  should	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  
the	  current	  estimation	  on	  the	  crime	  rate	  in	  Southern	  states.	  
LIT	  
In	  chapter	  one,	  the	  dummy	  variable	  for	  whether	  a	  state’s	  prison	  system	  was	  under	  court	  
order	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  higher	  parole-­‐waiver	  rates.	  	  It	  is	  there	  also	  included	  in	  
this	  current	  specification.	  Observations	  of	  this	  variable	  come	  from	  Levitt’s	   (1996)	  study	  on	  the	  
effect	  of	  prison	  overcrowding	  legislation.	  
Results	  
Murder	  Rates	  
Table	  2.1,	  column	  1	  displays	  the	  results	  for	  the	  state	  fixed-­‐effects	  regression	  for	  murder	  
rates.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  signs	  on	  the	  coefficients	  are	  as	  expected.	  	  The	  inmate	  assault	  rate	  is	  
negatively	  related	  to	  the	  state	  fixed	  effect	  for	  murder	  rates,	  suggesting	  that	  more	  violent	  prisons	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tend	   to	   deter	   murder.	   	   Per-­‐inmate	   expenditure	   is	   positively	   related	   to	   the	   murder	   rate,	  
suggesting	  that	  some	  variance	  in	  the	  residual	  murder	  rate	  across	  states	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  how	  
much	   a	   state	   spends	   per	   inmate.	   	   Higher	   spending	   per	   inmate	   may	   be	   associated	   with	   a	  
diminished	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  incarceration,	  but	  the	  results	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  
The	   state	   AIDS	   rate	   appears	   to	   have	   no	   effect	   on	   murder	   rates,	   thus	   the	   threat	   of	  
contracting	  AIDS	  during	   incarceration	  does	  not	   appear	   to	  deter	  murders.	   	  Disciplinary	   reports	  
per	   inmate	   suggest	   that	   states	   with	   strict	   prisons	  may	   deter	  murder,	   but	   the	   results	   are	   not	  
significant.	  
The	   South	   appears	   to	   have	   a	   higher	   murder	   rate	   than	   would	   otherwise	   be	   expected	  
based	  on	  the	  observable	  determinants	  of	  statewide	  murder	  rates.4	  	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  below,	  this	  
stands	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  estimates	  for	  other	  violent	  crimes	  and	  property	  crimes.	  
Although	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  there	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  states	  that	  
faced	   overcrowding	   litigation	   and	   the	   murder	   rate,	   suggesting	   that	   overcrowding	   may	   deter	  
murder.	  	  A	  related	  but	  slightly	  different	  interpretation	  is	  that	  prison	  overcrowding	  is	  a	  signal	  that	  
a	  state	  is	  “tough”	  on	  crime,	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  “tough”	  on	  criminals.	  
Violent	  Crime	  Rates	  
Table	  2.2,	  column	  2	  displays	  the	  results	  for	  the	  state	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  for	  violent	  
crime	  rates.	  	  The	  results	  for	  the	  violent	  crime	  rate	  regression	  are	  much	  stronger	  than	  for	  murder	  
rates,	  especially	  for	  the	  dummy	  variables.	  	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  violent	  crime	  rates	  are	  lower	  
in	  the	  South	  and	  lower	  in	  states	  that	  faced	  overcrowding	  litigation.	  	  These	  two	  variables	  explain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  All	  relevant	  demographic,	  economic,	  and	  legal	  control	  variables	  were	  included	  in	  the	  initial	  “KLS”	  
regression,	  and	  those	  factors	  explain	  much	  of	  why	  the	  South	  has	  a	  higher	  murder	  rate;	  however	  even	  
taking	  those	  factors	  into	  account,	  the	  murder	  rate	  in	  the	  South	  is	  higher	  than	  predicted.	  
	   29	  
almost	   50%	  of	   the	   variation	   in	   the	   state	   fixed	   effects	   for	   violent	   crime	   rates.	   	   The	   results	   are	  
especially	   strong	   for	   the	   litigation	   dummy,	   reinforcing	   the	   results	   from	   the	   murder	   rate	  
estimates.	   	  Additionally,	   the	  other	  explanatory	  variables	  generally	   support	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  
prison	   conditions	   affect	   crime	   rates.	   	   The	   inmate	   assault	   rate	   and	   AIDS	   infection	   rate	   is	  
statistically	  significant,	  but	  higher	  spending	  per	  inmate	  is	  not.	  
Property	  Crime	  Rates	  
Table	  2.3,	  column	  1	  displays	  the	  results	  for	  the	  state	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  for	  murder	  
rates.	  The	  results	  are	  striking.	   	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficients	  on	  the	  two	  dummy	  variables	  
suggests	  a	  very	  strong	  negative	  relationship	  with	  property	  crime	  rates.	  	  States	  in	  the	  South	  and	  
states	   that	   faced	  overcrowding	   litigation	  appear	   to	  have	  much	   less	  property	   crime	   than	  other	  
states,	  controlling	  for	  other	  factors.	  	  
Conclusion	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  regression	  analysis	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  some	  of	  the	  cross-­‐state	  
differences	  in	  violent	  crime	  rates	  and	  property	  crime	  rates	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  indicators	  of	  
prison	  conditions.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  cross-­‐state	  variation	  in	  murder	  rates	  can	  also	  be	  explained,	  but	  
the	  relationship	  is	  much	  weaker.	  	  In	  general,	  crime	  rates	  other	  than	  murder	  to	  be	  lower	  in	  the	  
South	  than	  would	  be	  expected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  observable	  factors,	  and	  states	  that	  faced	  
overcrowding	  litigation	  appear	  to	  be	  tough	  on	  crime.	  The	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  
hypothesis	  that	  variation	  in	  prison	  conditions	  across	  states	  explains	  some	  of	  differences	  in	  crime	  
rates	  across	  states	  over	  the	  long	  run.	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Table	  2.1	  	  Impact	  of	  Prison	  Conditions	  on	  State-­‐Fixed	  Effects	  for	  Murder	  Rates	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
	   	   	   	  
Inmate	  assaults	  per	  inmate	   -­‐1367	   	   -­‐1231	  
	   744.41	   	   746.69	  
	   -­‐1.84	   	   -­‐1.65	  
	   	   	   	  
Expenditures	  per	  inmate	   0.00438	   	   0.00309	  
	   0.0028	   	   0.0025	  
	   1.58	   	   1.25	  
	   	   	   	  
State	  AIDS	  rate	   0.0880	   	   0.5193	  
	   2.528	   	   2.511	  
	   0.03	   	   0.21	  
	   	   	   	  
%	  inmates	  psychotropic	  drugs	   785	   	   821	  
	   387	   	   382	  
	   2.03	   	   2.15	  
	   	   	   	  
Disciplinary	  reports	  per	  inmate	   -­‐23.69	   	   -­‐20.69	  
	   25.47	   	   25.68	  
	   -­‐0.93	   	   -­‐0.81	  
	   	   	   	  
South	  dummy	   91.59	   44.68	   	  
	   53.05	   52.34	   	  
	   1.73	   0.85	   	  
	   	   	   	  
Overcrowding	  litigation	  dummy	   -­‐56.30	   -­‐73.63	   	  
	   54.47	   52.34	   	  
	   -­‐1.03	   -­‐1.41	   	  
	   	   	   	  
R-­‐squared	   0.266	   0.043	   0.205	  
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared	   0.141	   0.001	   0.113	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Table	  2.2	  	  Impact	  of	  Prison	  Conditions	  on	  State-­‐Fixed	  Effects	  for	  Violent	  Crime	  Rates	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
	   	   	   	  
Inmate	  assaults	  per	  inmate	   -­‐86100	   	   -­‐65256	  
	   37090	   	   45666	  
	   -­‐2.32	   	   -­‐1.43	  
	   	   	   	  
Expenditures	  per	  inmate	   -­‐0.005	   	   0.298	  
	   0.138	   	   0.152	  
	   -­‐0.04	   	   1.96	  
	   	   	   	  
State	  AIDS	  rate	   -­‐461	   	   -­‐589	  
	   126	   	   154	  
	   -­‐3.66	   	   -­‐3.84	  
	   	   	   	  
%	  inmates	  psychotropic	  drugs	   50509	   	   72945	  
	   19296	   	   23346	  
	   2.62	   	   3.12	  
	   	   	   	  
Disciplinary	  reports	  per	  inmate	   -­‐1897	   	   -­‐1272	  
	   1269	   	   1570	  
	   -­‐1.50	   	   -­‐0.81	  
	   	   	   	  
South	  dummy	   -­‐6257	   -­‐8656	   	  
	   2643	   3217	   	  
	   -­‐2.37	   -­‐2.69	   	  
	   	   	   	  
Overcrowding	  litigation	  dummy	   -­‐10324	   -­‐13287.6	   	  
	   2714	   3217	   	  
	   -­‐3.80	   -­‐4.13	   	  
	   	   	   	  
R-­‐squared	   0.732	   0.468	   0.562	  
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared	   0.686	   0.445	   0.511	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Table	  2.3	  	  Impact	  of	  Prison	  Conditions	  on	  State-­‐Fixed	  Effects	  for	  Property	  Crime	  Rates	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
	   	   	   	  
Inmate	  assaults	  per	  inmate	   -­‐216494	   	   -­‐152169	  
	   121404	   	   184073	  
	   -­‐1.78	   	   -­‐0.83	  
	   	   	   	  
Expenditures	  per	  inmate	   0.377	   	   2.036	  
	   0.453	   	   0.613	  
	   0.83	   	   3.32	  
	   	   	   	  
State	  AIDS	  rate	   343	   	   -­‐333	  
	   412	   	   619	  
	   0.83	   	   -­‐0.54	  
	   	   	   	  
%	  inmates	  psychotropic	  drugs	   99511	   	   193149	  
	   63160	   	   94103	  
	   1.58	   	   2.05	  
	   	   	   	  
Disciplinary	  reports	  per	  inmate	   -­‐488	   	   1684	  
	   4153	   	   6329	  
	   -­‐0.12	   	   0.27	  
	   	   	   	  
South	  dummy	   -­‐48647	   -­‐52419	   	  
	   8652	   8052	   	  
	   -­‐5.62	   -­‐6.51	   	  
	   	   	   	  
Overcrowding	  litigation	  dummy	   -­‐34312	   -­‐34254	   	  
	   8884	   8052	   	  
	   -­‐3.86	   -­‐4.25	   	  
	   	   	   	  
R-­‐squared	   0.730	   0.686	   0.331	  
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared	   0.683	   0.673	   0.253	  




CHAPTER	  THREE:	  	   THE	  EFFECT	  OF	  TRUTH-­‐IN-­‐SENTENCING	  LAWS	  AND	  
SENTENCING	  GUIDELINES	  ON	  THE	  CRIME	  RATE	  
	  
This	   study	   explores	   the	   impact	   of	   truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	   laws	   and	   sentencing	   guidelines	   on	   crime	   rates.	   	   Truth-­‐in-­‐
sentencing	  laws	  and	  sentencing	  guidelines	  represent	  a	  shift	  in	  policy	  towards	  determinate	  sentencing	  and	  away	  from	  
discretion	  in	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  
	  
Introduction	  
In	   the	   last	   twenty-­‐five	   years	   many	   states	   have	   enacted	   truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	   laws	   and	  
sentencing	   guidelines,	   reflecting	   the	   nationwide	   shift	   from	   indeterminate	   to	   determinate	  
sentencing.	   	   Through	   the	   1970s,	   all	   states	   had	   criminal-­‐justice	   systems	   that	   granted	   much	  
authority	  to	  judges	  and	  parole	  boards.	  Judicial	  systems	  that	  grant	  such	  discretionary	  power	  are	  
referred	  to	  as	  “indeterminate	  sentencing”	  regimes.	  	  In	  contrast,	  pure	  “determinate	  sentencing”	  
regimes	  do	  not	  grant	  judges	  or	  parole	  boards	  the	  power	  to	  affect	  the	  time	  served	  by	  a	  convicted	  
offender.	  
Starting	   in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  determinate-­‐sentencing	   laws	  were	  enacted	  in	  many	  states.	  	  
The	  two	  cases	  of	  determinate-­‐sentencing	  reform	  analyzed	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	  
laws	   and	   sentencing	   guidelines.	   	   Truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	   (“TIS”)	   laws	   severely	   limit	   the	   power	   of	  
state	  parole	  boards	  by	   setting	  a	  minimum	  mandatory	  percentage	  of	  a	   sentence	   that	  a	  violent	  
offender	   must	   serve	   to	   be	   parole-­‐eligible.1	  	   Sentencing	   guidelines	   are	   rules	   that	   set	   out	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  most	  states,	  it	  is	  85%.	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uniform	   sentencing	   policy	   for	   convicted	   offenders	   requiring	   judges	   to	   adhere	   to	   specific	  
sentencing	  laws,	  which	  are	  determined	  by	  state	  sentencing	  commissions.	  
Thirty	   states	   have	   implemented	   TIS	   laws,	   and	   eighteen	   states	   have	   implemented	  
sentencing	  guidelines.	  The	  theoretical	  prediction	  on	  TIS	  laws	  is	  clear:	  	  increasing	  the	  penalty	  for	  
violent	  crimes	  should	   lead	  to	  a	  reduction	   in	  the	  violent	  crime	  rate.	   	  Additionally,	  analyzing	  the	  
impacts	   of	   TIS	   laws	   may	   tell	   us	   something	   about	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   state	   parole	   boards,	  
because	  TIS	  laws	  diminish	  their	  authority.	  
The	  theoretical	  prediction	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  sentencing	  guidelines	  on	  the	  crime	  rate	  is	  not	  
as	  clear.	  	  Sentencing	  guidelines	  reduce	  the	  variance	  of	  penalties	  associated	  with	  conviction,	  and	  
thus	   should	   lead	   to	   reduced	   crime	   rates	   if	   criminals	   are	   indeed	   risk-­‐seekers.2	  	   Additionally,	  
analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  sentencing	  guidelines	  may	  tell	  us	  how	  efficient	   judges	  are	   in	  assessing	  
the	   true	   recidivism	   risk	   of	   offenders.	   	   If	   judges	  were	   in	   fact	   using	   this	   information	   efficiently,	  
then	  crime	  rates	  may	  go	  up	  in	  response	  to	  the	  curtailing	  of	  judicial	  discretion.	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   opportunity	   that	   cross-­‐state	   variation	   in	   TIS	   legislation	   offers	   for	  
assessing	  the	  effect	  of	  such	  laws	  on	  the	  crime	  rate,	  this	  variation	  also	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  study	  
the	  relative	  importance	  of	  deterrence	  versus	  incapacitation.	  	  Given	  that	  TIS	  laws	  apply	  to	  violent	  
criminals,	   those	   criminals	   will	   substitute	   toward	   property	   crimes	   if	   the	   deterrence	   effect	  
dominates.	  	  If	  the	  incapacitation	  effect	  dominates,	  both	  violent	  crime	  rates	  and	  property	  crime	  
rates	  should	  go	  down,	  because	  more	  criminals	  are	  behind	  bars.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  Becker	  (1968).	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The	   question	   of	   why	   so	   many	   states	   (and	   the	   federal	   system)	   have	   moved	   toward	  
determinate-­‐sentencing	   regimes	   is	   an	   interesting	  one.	   	   Presumably,	   judges	   and	  parole	   boards	  
have	   some	   information	   about	   the	   recidivism	   risk	   of	   an	   offender,	   along	   with	   a	   comparative	  
advantage	  in	  processing	  that	  information.	  	  Why	  prevent	  them	  from	  using	  such	  information?	  	  The	  
explanation	   must	   be	   that	   state	   legislatures	   have	   a	   divergent	   interest	   from	   state	   judges	   and	  
parole	  boards,	  and	  that	  for	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  three	  the	  objective	  is	  not	  optimal	  crime	  policy.	  
Literature	  Review	  
Dharmapala,	   Garoupa,	   and	   Shepherd	   (2006)	   (“DGS”)	   explore	   the	   idea	   of	   divergent	  
interests	   among	   the	   legislature,	   judiciary,	   and	   parole	   boards	   at	   the	   state	   level.	   	   Determinate	  
sentencing	   reforms	   allow	   state	   legislatures	   to	   re-­‐assert	   their	   authority	   over	   the	   judiciary	   and	  
parole	  boards.	   	  DGS	  develop	  a	  model	   that	  predicts	   that	  a	  state	   ismore	   likely	   to	  move	   	   toward	  
determinate	  sentencing	   	  when	  the	  decisions	  of	   judges	  and	  parole	  boards	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  
goals	  of	  the	  legislature.	  	  Parole	  boards	  are	  appointed	  by	  state	  governors,	  and	  judges	  are	  either	  
appointed	   by	   state	   governors	   or	   elected.	   	   All	   of	   these	   groups	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   influenced	   by	  
political	   considerations.	   	   DGS	   find	   that	   determinate-­‐sentencing	   laws	   are	   more	   likely	   with	   a	  
longer	  history	  of	  divided	  government	  (i.e.,	  when	  the	  governor’s	  party	  affiliation	  is	  different	  from	  
the	  party	  that	  holds	  a	  majority	  in	  the	  houses	  of	  the	  legislature).	  
Several	  papers	  have	  examined	  the	  effects	  of	  determinate-­‐sentencing	  regimes	  on	  crime.	  	  
Shepherd	  (2002)	  examines	  the	  effects	  of	  TIS	   laws	  using	  a	  county-­‐level	  data	  set.	   	  She	  finds	  that	  
TIS	   laws	  decrease	  murders	  by	  16	  percent,	   aggravated	  assaults	  by	  12	  percent,	   robberies	  by	  24	  
percent,	   rapes	   by	   12	   percent,	   and	   larcenies	   by	   3	   percent.	   	   Additionally,	   Shepherd	   finds	   that	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offenders	   substitute	   into	  property	   crimes	   in	   response:	  burglaries	   increased	  by	  20	  percent	  and	  
auto	  thefts	  by	  15	  percent.	  
Mead	  and	  Waldfogel	  (1998)	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  sentencing	  guidelines	  on	  the	  cost	  of	  
punishment.	  When	   judges	   have	   discretion,	   they	   tend	   to	   substitute	   fines	   for	   prison	   sentences	  
when	  the	  offender	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  pay.	  	  Sentencing	  guidelines	  define	  minimum	  and	  maximum	  
sentences	  a	   judge	  may	   impose,	   so	   judges	  may	  be	  prevented	   from	  efficiently	  substituting	   fines	  
for	   prison	   time.	   	   Meade	   and	   Waldfogel	   find	   that	   sentencing	   guidelines	   increase	   the	   cost	   of	  
punishment	  by	  almost	  5%	  of	  the	  total	  	  imprisonment	  cost	  of	  federal	  offenders.	  
Anderson,	   Kling,	   and	   Stith	   (1999)	   analyze	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   Federal	   Sentencing	  
Guidelines	   on	   interjudge	   sentencing	   disparity,	   a	   measure	   of	   the	   variance	   of	   sentence	   length	  
across	  judges.	  	  They	  find	  that	  the	  expected	  difference	  between	  two	  typical	  judges	  in	  the	  average	  
sentence	  length	  was	  about	  17	  percent	  (or	  4.9	  months)	  in	  1986-­‐87,	  before	  sentencing	  guidelines,	  
and	   fell	   to	   about	   11	   percent	   (or	   3.9	   months)	   in	   1988-­‐93	   after	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
sentencing	  guidelines.	  	  
Parker	   and	   Atkins	   (1999)	   analyze	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   federal	   Sentencing	   Commission’s	  
1991	  sentencing	  guidelines	  for	  corporations	  convicted	  of	  federal	  crimes.	  	  Despite	  the	  supposed	  
intent	   of	   increasing	   corporate	   fines,	   they	   find	   no	   statistically	   significant	   change	   in	   monetary	  
penalties	  associated	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  1991	  guidelines.	  
Shepherd	   (2007)	  examines	   the	   impact	   that	   sentencing	  guidelines	  have	  on	  crime	   rates.	  	  
She	  finds	  that	  sentencing	  guidelines	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  increases	  in	  crime,	  and	  provides	  
some	   theoretical	   arguments	   as	   to	   why	   this	   would	   be	   the	   case.	   	   First,	   judges	  may	   be	   able	   to	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identify	   high-­‐risk	   offenders,	   but	   sentence	   enhancements	   limit	   judges’	   ability	   to	   impose	   long	  
sentence	  on	  them.	  	  Second,	  sentencing	  guidelines	  limit	  the	  ability	  of	  judges	  to	  impose	  very	  short	  
sentences,	   and	   the	   legal	   system	   as	   a	  whole	  may	   be	   unwilling	   to	   impose	   higher	   sentences	   on	  
these	   lower-­‐risk	  offenders.	   	   Instead	  the	  judges	  and	  juries	  may	  be	  acquitting	  such	  offenders,	  or	  
the	   case	   may	   not	   even	   be	   prosecuted.	   	   Third,	   if	   longer	   sentences	   are	   imposed	   on	   low-­‐risk	  
offenders,	  these	  offenders	  may	  become	  career	  criminals	  in	  response	  to	  the	  negative	  impact	  long	  
sentences	   have	   on	   legitimate	   employment	   prospects.	   	   Fourth,	   if	   offenders	   are	   actually	   risk-­‐
averse	  rather	   than	  risk-­‐loving,	  decreasing	  the	  variance	   in	   the	  expected	  penalty	  will	   reduce	  the	  
deterrent	  effect	  of	  conviction.	  
Using	   a	   state-­‐level	   panel	   data	   set,	   Shepherd	   finds	   that	   sentencing	   guidelines	   are	  
associated	  with	   higher	   crime	   rates.	   	   There	   is	   a	   statistically	   significant	   increase	   in	   both	   violent	  
crime	  rates	  and	  property	  crimes	  rates	  in	  states	  adopting	  sentencing	  guidelines.	  
Data	  and	  Estimation	  
I	   use	   a	   similar	  methodology	   to	   Shepherd	   (2007)	   in	   this	   paper.	   	   I	   use	   state-­‐level	   panel	  
data	  to	  determine	  the	  impact	  of	  both	  sentencing	  guidelines	  and	  TIS	  laws.	  	  I	  use	  the	  Katz-­‐Levitt-­‐
Shustorovich	  (“KLS”)	  data	  set,	  extended	  through	  1999,	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  laws.	   	   I	  
add	  dummy	  variables	  for	  TIS	  and	  sentencing	  guidelines	  to	  their	  specification,	  and	  include	  all	  of	  
their	  variables.	  	  The	  KLS	  specification	  for	  crime	  rates	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  specification	  Shepherd	  
uses,	  but	  not	  all	  the	  control	  variables	  are	  identical.	  
Empirical	  Model	  
I	  estimate	  the	  equation:	  𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐸!" = 𝛽!𝑇𝐼𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐺!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑇𝐻!" + 𝐵!𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑇𝐸!" + Χ!"Γ + 𝜆! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!",	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where	   s	   indexes	   states	   and	   t	   corresponds	   to	   time.	   	   CRIME	   is	   the	   crime	   rate	   per	   100,000	  
residents,	  TIS	   is	  a	  dummy	  variable	   indicating	  whether	   the	  state	  had	  a	  TIS	   law,	  SG	   is	  a	  dummy	  
variable	   indicating	  whether	   the	   state	  had	   sentencing	  guidelines,	  DEATH	   is	   the	  death	   rate	  per	  
1,000	   state	   prisoners,	   and	  EXECUTE	   is	   the	   execution	   rate	   per	   1,000	   state	   prisoners.	   	   Χ	   is	   a	  
vector	  of	  criminal-­‐justice,	  economic,	  and	  demographic	  variables.	  	  The	  indicator	  variables	  λ	  and	  δ	  
represent	  state	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects.	  
The	  original	  KLS	  study	  focused	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  DEATH	  and	  EXECUTE	  on	  the	  crime	  rate.	  	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   three	   different	   crime	   rates	   are	   used	   as	   the	   dependent	   variable	   in	   separate	  
specifications:	  	  the	  murder	  rate,	  the	  violent	  crime	  rate,	  and	  the	  property	  crime	  rate.	  	  	  
The	   predicted	   sign	   on	   TIS	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   property	   crime	   rate	   is	   ambiguous,	  
depending	  on	  whether	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  or	  the	  incapacitation	  effect	  dominates.	  	  The	  sign	  on	  
SG	  is	  ambiguous	  for	  all	  three	  specifications,	  for	  the	  reasons	  discussed	  above.	  
Results	  
The	   results	   suggest	   that	  TIS	   laws	  and	  sentencing	  guidelines	  do	  affect	   crime	   rates.	   	   For	  
murder	   rates	   (Table	   3.3),	  most	   of	   the	   specifications	   indicate	   that	   TIS	   laws	   reduce	  murders	   by	  
between	  half	  a	  murder	  and	  one	  murder	  per	  100,000	  residents,	  while	  sentencing	  guidelines	  tend	  
to	  increase	  murders	  by	  about	  the	  same	  amount.	  	  Both	  dummy	  variables	  are	  significant	  in	  some	  
but	  not	  all	  specifications	  estimated.	  
For	   violent	   crime	   (Table	   3.4),	   TIS	   laws	   are	   associated	  with	   a	   reduction	   of	   offenses	   of	  
between	   28	   and	   113	   per	   100,00	   residents,	   depending	   on	   the	   specification.	   	   The	   estimated	  
coefficient	  on	  TIS	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  in	  four	  of	  the	  eight	  specifications,	  and	  
one	  more	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  sentencing	  guidelines,	  the	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average	   increase	   is	   about	   20	   offenses	   per	   100,000	   residents	   and	   three	   of	   the	   eight	   are	  
significant	  at	   the	  10%	  level.	   	  However,	   the	  estimated	  coefficients	  on	  sentencing	  guidelines	  are	  
not	  positive	  for	  all	  specifications.	  
The	  results	  for	  property	  crime	  (Table	  3.5)	  are	  interesting,	  as	  the	  sign	  on	  property	  crimes	  
with	  respect	  to	  TIS	  laws	  measures	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  deterrence	  versus	  incapacitation,	  
as	   discussed	   earlier.	   	   Unlike	   Shepherd	   (2002),	   my	   results	   suggest	   the	   incapacitation	   effect	  
dominates:	   	   the	   coefficient	   estimates	   on	   TIS	   are	   negative	   in	   seven	   of	   eight	   specifications,	  
indicating	   that	   violent	   offenders	   do	   not	   substitute	   towards	   property	   crime	   in	   response	   to	   TIS	  
laws.	   Sentencing	   guidelines	   appear	   to	   have	   more	   effect	   on	   property	   crimes	   than	   for	   violent	  
crimes,	   achieving	   statistical	   significance	   in	   almost	   all	   specifications,	   and	   indicating	   that	  
sentencing	  guidelines	   increase	  property	  crimes	  on	  average	  of	  about	  200	  offenses	  per	  100,000	  
residents.	  
Conclusion	  
The	   result	   that	   sentencing	   guidelines	   appear	   to	   increase	   crime	   rates	   is	   somewhat	  
surprising.	   	   Combined	   with	   the	   result	   that	   Truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	   laws	   appear	   to	   reduce	   crime	  
rates,	   and	   the	   implication	   is	   that	   the	   move	   away	   from	   a	   discretionary	   regime	   offers	   mixed	  
results.	  	  These	  results	  tend	  to	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  parole	  boards	  were	  ‘soft’	  on	  crime,	  but	  
do	  not	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  judges	  were.	   	  To	  the	  contrary,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  judges	  
were	  effectively	  using	  specific	  information	  available	  to	  them	  when	  sentencing	  offenders.	  
	   	  
	   40	  
Table	  3.1	  	  States	  with	  TIS	  Laws	  and	  year	  enacted.	  Arizona	   1993	   	   New	  Hampshire	  	   1982	  California	   1994	   	   New	  Jersey	   1997	  Connecticut	   1994	   	   New	  York	   1995	  Delaware	   1989	   	   North	  Carolina	   1993	  Florida	   1995	   	   North	  Dakota	   1995	  Georgia	   1994	   	   Ohio	   1995	  Illinois	   1995	   	   Oklahoma	   1997	  Iowa	   1996	   	   Oregon	   1989	  Kansas	   1992	   	   Pennsylvania	   1911	  Louisiana	   1995	   	   South	  Carolina	   1995	  Maine	   1995	   	   South	  Dakota	   1996	  Michigan	   1994	   	   Tennessee	   1995	  Minnesota	   1992	   	   Virginia	   1994	  Mississippi	   1995	   	   Washington	   1990	  Missouri	   1994	   	   Wisconsin	   1999	  






Table	  3.2	  	  States	  with	  Sentencing	  Guidelines	  and	  year	  enacted.	  Arkansas	   1994	   	   North	  Carolina	   1994	  Delaware	   1987	   	   Ohio	   1996	  Florida	   1983	   	   Oregon	   1989	  Kansas	   1993	   	   Pennsylvania	   1982	  Louisiana	   1992	   	   Tennessee	   1989	  Maryland	   1983	   	   Utah	   1993	  Michigan	   1981	   	   Virginia	   1991	  Minnesota	   1980	   	   Washington	   1984	  Missouri	   1997	   	   Wisconsin	   1985	  
Source:	  	  (Sabol,	  et	  al.	  2002)	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Table	  3.3	  	  Effect	  of	  TIS	  Laws	  and	  Sentencing	  Guidelines	  on	  Murder	  Rates	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	  
Truth-­‐in-­‐Sentencing	  dummy	   0.11	   -­‐0.50	   -­‐0.67	   -­‐0.94	   -­‐0.97	   -­‐1.09	   -­‐0.73	   -­‐0.93	  
	   1.01	   0.63	   0.56	   0.67	   0.90	   0.56	   0.76	   0.46	  
	   0.11	   -­‐0.79	   -­‐1.19	   -­‐1.39	   -­‐1.08	   -­‐1.93	   -­‐0.96	   -­‐2.01	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sentencing	  guidelines	  dummy	   0.00	   0.45	   0.29	   0.78	   1.43	   1.03	   0.62	   0.53	  
	   0.93	   0.47	   0.60	   0.39	   0.66	   0.34	   0.45	   0.43	  
	   0.00	   0.95	   0.47	   2.00	   2.17	   3.07	   1.38	   1.23	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prison	  deaths/1000	  prisoners	   	   -­‐0.11	   	   -­‐0.13	   	   -­‐0.05	   	   -­‐0.02	  
	   	   0.06	   	   0.05	   	   0.04	   	   0.03	  
	   	   -­‐1.96	   	   -­‐2.48	   	   -­‐1.20	   	   -­‐0.51	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Executions/1000	  prisoners	   	   -­‐0.60	   	   -­‐0.42	   	   -­‐0.26	   	   -­‐0.24	  
	   	   0.37	   	   0.39	   	   0.18	   	   0.14	  
	   	   -­‐1.64	   	   -­‐1.08	   	   -­‐1.46	   	   -­‐1.66	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prisoners/crime(-­‐1)	   	   -­‐7.98	   	   -­‐12.81	   	   -­‐5.74	   	   -­‐6.54	  
	   	   5.67	   	   6.68	   	   4.74	   	   4.31	  
	   	   -­‐1.41	   	   -­‐1.92	   	   -­‐1.21	   	   -­‐1.52	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prisoners/100,000(-­‐1)	   	   0.00	   	   0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	  
	   	   0.01	   	   0.01	   	   0.01	   	   0.00	  
	   	   0.41	   	   0.95	   	   -­‐1.85	   	   -­‐1.72	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Real	  per	  capita	  income	  (*1000)	   	   0.00	   	   0.03	   	   0.06	   	   0.07	  
	   	   0.02	   	   0.03	   	   0.02	   	   0.02	  
	   	   0.18	   	   1.11	   	   2.84	   	   3.97	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Insured	  unemployment	  rate	   	   -­‐0.26	   	   -­‐0.12	   	   -­‐0.14	   	   -­‐0.07	  
	   	   0.10	   	   0.10	   	   0.06	   	   0.06	  
	   	   -­‐2.49	   	   -­‐1.25	   	   -­‐2.33	   	   -­‐1.25	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Black	  (%)	   	   34.75	   	   31.83	   	   23.09	   	   17.04	  
	   	   8.62	   	   11.19	   	   15.88	   	   14.99	  
	   	   4.03	   	   2.85	   	   1.45	   	   1.14	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Urban	  (%)	   	   -­‐3.07	   	   -­‐10.95	   	   -­‐3.39	   	   1.36	  
	   	   6.01	   	   6.52	   	   9.50	   	   8.56	  
	   	   -­‐0.51	   	   -­‐1.68	   	   -­‐0.36	   	   0.16	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
0-­‐24-­‐year-­‐olds	  (%)	   	   31.69	   	   19.04	   	   -­‐0.34	   	   8.62	  
	   	   18.29	   	   11.66	   	   8.98	   	   8.50	  
	   	   1.73	   	   1.63	   	   -­‐0.04	   	   1.01	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
25-­‐44-­‐year-­‐olds	  (%)	   	   1.29	   	   -­‐17.82	   	   -­‐20.25	   	   -­‐31.22	  
	   	   17.84	   	   17.63	   	   24.26	   	   20.11	  
	   	   0.07	   	   -­‐1.01	   	   -­‐0.83	   	   -­‐1.55	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Infant	  mortality	  rate	  (*1000)	   	   0.00	   	   0.00	   	   0.00	   	   0.00	  
	   	   0.00	   	   0.00	   	   0.00	   	   0.00	  
	   	   0.16	   	   -­‐0.22	   	   0.64	   	   1.69	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared	   0.6830	   0.8422	   0.8208	   0.8697	   0.8777	   0.9079	   0.9378	   0.9413	  
Region-­‐year	  interactions?	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	   No	   No	  
State	  trends?	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	  
State-­‐decade	  interactions?	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
Note:	  	  Standard	  errors	  appear	  in	  gray	  italics.	  	  T-­‐stats	  appear	  below	  std.	  errors.	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Table	  3.4	  	  Effect	  of	  TIS	  Laws	  and	  Sentencing	  Guidelines	  on	  Violent	  Crime	  Rates	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	  
Truth-­‐in-­‐Sentencing	  dummy	   -­‐28.46	   -­‐46.73	   -­‐30.39	   -­‐53.10	   -­‐113.00	   -­‐102.98	   -­‐69.22	   -­‐67.74	  
	   21.59	   27.18	   24.19	   35.56	   46.03	   36.06	   32.47	   26.42	  
	   -­‐1.32	   -­‐1.72	   -­‐1.26	   -­‐1.49	   -­‐2.45	   -­‐2.86	   -­‐2.13	   -­‐2.56	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sentencing	  guidelines	  dummy	   -­‐22.79	   10.49	   -­‐29.21	   6.17	   72.74	   49.06	   35.67	   34.38	  
	   44.96	   34.44	   49.99	   33.02	   45.20	   27.26	   19.67	   19.89	  
	   -­‐0.51	   0.30	   -­‐0.58	   0.19	   1.61	   1.80	   1.81	   1.73	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prison	  deaths/1000	  prisoners	   	   -­‐7.48	   	   -­‐8.74	   	   -­‐3.69	   	   -­‐1.37	  
	   	   2.62	   	   2.44	   	   1.77	   	   0.94	  
	   	   -­‐2.86	   	   -­‐3.59	   	   -­‐2.09	   	   -­‐1.47	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Executions/1000	  prisoners	   	   -­‐34.30	   	   -­‐21.12	   	   3.29	   	   -­‐1.18	  
	   	   13.51	   	   11.77	   	   7.46	   	   3.05	  
	   	   -­‐2.54	   	   -­‐1.80	   	   0.44	   	   -­‐0.39	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prisoners/crime(-­‐1)	   	   -­‐1164.75	   	   -­‐1290.74	   	   -­‐628.29	   	   -­‐743.33	  
	   	   258.46	   	   252.25	   	   255.53	   	   195.50	  
	   	   -­‐4.51	   	   -­‐5.12	   	   -­‐2.46	   	   -­‐3.80	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prisoners/100,000(-­‐1)	   	   0.83	   	   0.84	   	   0.02	   	   0.16	  
	   	   0.18	   	   0.20	   	   0.15	   	   0.15	  
	   	   4.70	   	   4.29	   	   0.13	   	   1.02	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Real	  per	  capita	  income	  (*1000)	   	   1.61	   	   1.72	   	   -­‐0.56	   	   1.03	  
	   	   1.69	   	   1.98	   	   1.48	   	   0.84	  
	   	   0.95	   	   0.87	   	   -­‐0.38	   	   1.23	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Insured	  unemployment	  rate	   	   -­‐7.37	   	   2.94	   	   -­‐3.93	   	   4.11	  
	   	   7.76	   	   5.47	   	   4.81	   	   3.49	  
	   	   -­‐0.95	   	   0.54	   	   -­‐0.82	   	   1.18	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Black	  (%)	   	   1865.00	   	   2012.80	   	   2671.72	   	   1632.55	  
	   	   889.59	   	   1037.72	   	   1082.45	   	   1077.36	  
	   	   2.10	   	   1.94	   	   2.47	   	   1.52	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Urban	  (%)	   	   868.48	   	   619.79	   	   455.84	   	   1057.94	  
	   	   450.12	   	   578.23	   	   490.85	   	   520.67	  
	   	   1.93	   	   1.07	   	   0.93	   	   2.03	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
0-­‐24-­‐year-­‐olds	  (%)	   	   1653.49	   	   1413.55	   	   -­‐470.67	   	   -­‐419.69	  
	   	   1137.25	   	   1086.71	   	   508.83	   	   599.17	  
	   	   1.45	   	   1.30	   	   -­‐0.92	   	   -­‐0.70	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
25-­‐44-­‐year-­‐olds	  (%)	   	   -­‐2454.5	   	   -­‐2576.0	   	   -­‐2250.5	   	   -­‐1202.7	  
	   	   2012.40	   	   2333.73	   	   1737.25	   	   1362.41	  
	   	   -­‐1.22	   	   -­‐1.10	   	   -­‐1.30	   	   -­‐0.88	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Infant	  mortality	  rate	  (*1000)	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   0.03	   	   0.08	   	   0.07	  
	   	   0.05	   	   0.05	   	   0.04	   	   0.03	  
	   	   -­‐0.26	   	   0.53	   	   1.89	   	   2.64	  
	   	   0.80	   	   0.60	   	   0.07	   	   0.01	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared	   0.8323	   0.9042	   0.8629	   0.9220	   0.9230	   0.9516	   0.9624	   0.9767	  
Region-­‐year	  interactions?	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	   No	   No	  
State	  trends?	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	  
State-­‐decade	  interactions?	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
Note:	  	  Standard	  errors	  appear	  in	  gray	  italics.	  	  T-­‐stats	  appear	  below	  std.	  errors.	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Table	  3.5	  	  Effect	  of	  TIS	  law	  and	  Sentencing	  Guidelines	  on	  Property	  Crime	  Rates	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	  
Truth-­‐in-­‐Sentencing	  dummy	   -­‐92.16	   -­‐104.43	   -­‐74.71	   -­‐86.54	   -­‐210.97	   -­‐198.91	   -­‐109.49	   -­‐134.24	  
	   83.42	   89.67	   81.72	   85.79	   148.65	   111.87	   99.86	   68.33	  
	   -­‐1.10	   -­‐1.16	   -­‐0.91	   -­‐1.01	   -­‐1.42	   -­‐1.78	   -­‐1.10	   -­‐1.96	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sentencing	  guidelines	  dummy	   177.76	   191.32	   112.14	   121.14	   339.61	   233.54	   187.52	   183.88	  
	   96.23	   74.51	   53.36	   46.72	   126.34	   77.85	   66.02	   66.31	  
	   1.85	   2.57	   2.10	   2.59	   2.69	   3.00	   2.84	   2.77	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prison	  deaths/1000	  prisoners	   	   -­‐8.64	   	   -­‐10.24	   	   -­‐2.40	   	   -­‐5.90	  
	   	   10.35	   	   8.45	   	   9.00	   	   5.23	  
	   	   -­‐0.83	   	   -­‐1.21	   	   -­‐0.27	   	   -­‐1.13	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Executions/1000	  prisoners	   	   -­‐24.92	   	   -­‐46.44	   	   23.22	   	   -­‐1.26	  
	   	   30.15	   	   30.72	   	   29.10	   	   9.27	  
	   	   -­‐0.83	   	   -­‐1.51	   	   0.80	   	   -­‐0.14	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prisoners/crime(-­‐1)	   	   -­‐2551.72	   	   -­‐2029.52	   	   -­‐658.65	   	   -­‐1728.43	  
	   	   700.95	   	   663.49	   	   813.08	   	   528.94	  
	   	   -­‐3.64	   	   -­‐3.06	   	   -­‐0.81	   	   -­‐3.27	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prisoners/100,000(-­‐1)	   	   0.95	   	   0.42	   	   -­‐1.82	   	   -­‐0.79	  
	   	   0.45	   	   0.53	   	   0.64	   	   0.46	  
	   	   2.10	   	   0.78	   	   -­‐2.83	   	   -­‐1.71	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Real	  per	  capita	  income	  (*1000)	   	   2.56	   	   0.68	   	   -­‐2.23	   	   -­‐4.43	  
	   	   2.71	   	   3.74	   	   4.60	   	   3.19	  
	   	   0.94	   	   0.18	   	   -­‐0.48	   	   -­‐1.39	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Insured	  unemployment	  rate	   	   39.67	   	   34.82	   	   31.74	   	   37.70	  
	   	   16.51	   	   12.85	   	   13.37	   	   12.76	  
	   	   2.40	   	   2.71	   	   2.37	   	   2.95	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Black	  (%)	   	   508.36	   	   726.92	   	   9922.53	   	   3545.25	  
	   	   1963.22	   	   1948.79	   	   4860.64	   	   3770.65	  
	   	   0.26	   	   0.37	   	   2.04	   	   0.94	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Urban	  (%)	   	   769.07	   	   884.37	   	   -­‐850.77	   	   708.07	  
	   	   1189.31	   	   1338.38	   	   1999.03	   	   1639.51	  
	   	   0.65	   	   0.66	   	   -­‐0.43	   	   0.43	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
0-­‐24-­‐year-­‐olds	  (%)	   	   2393.18	   	   3425.19	   	   708.32	   	   1034.23	  
	   	   1487.88	   	   1632.59	   	   2257.68	   	   1536.96	  
	   	   1.61	   	   2.10	   	   0.31	   	   0.67	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
25-­‐44-­‐year-­‐olds	  (%)	   	   -­‐4634.53	   	   -­‐3798.11	   	   -­‐7285.41	   	   -­‐4872.98	  
	   	   3454.54	   	   3525.97	   	   6000.02	   	   3112.77	  
	   	   -­‐1.34	   	   -­‐1.08	   	   -­‐1.21	   	   -­‐1.57	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Infant	  mortality	  rate	  (*1000)	   	   -­‐0.20	   	   -­‐0.06	   	   0.07	   	   0.02	  
	   	   0.13	   	   0.08	   	   0.10	   	   0.07	  
	   	   -­‐1.49	   	   -­‐0.67	   	   0.64	   	   0.33	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared	   0.8323	   0.8909	   0.9021	   0.9247	   0.8911	   0.9277	   0.9742	   0.9649	  
Region-­‐year	  interactions?	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	   No	   No	  
State	  trends?	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	  
State-­‐decade	  interactions?	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
Note:	  	  Standard	  errors	  appear	  in	  gray	  italics.	  	  T-­‐stats	  appear	  below	  std.	  errors.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR:	  	   SOME	  DETERMINANTS	  OF	  INMATE	  MISCONDUCT	  
	  
Using	  data	  from	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Justice	  Statistics’	  Census	  of	  State	  and	  Federal	  Adult	  Correctional	  Facilities,	  I	  analyze	  the	  
effect	   of	   limiting	   discretionary	   parole,	   the	   death	   penalty,	   and	   also	   prison	   conditions,	   on	   measures	   of	   inmate	  
misconduct.	  	  I	  find	  that	  many	  of	  these	  factors	  appear	  to	  affect	  the	  rates	  of	  inmate	  misconduct.	  
	  
Introduction	  
In	   states	  with	   discretionary	   parole	   (i.e.,	   the	   authority	   of	   a	   parole	   board	   to	   reduce	   an	  
inmate’s	   sentence),	   one	   reason	   for	   that	   granting	   that	   discretion	   is	   to	   create	   incentives	   for	  
inmates	  to	  follow	  prison	  rules	  of	  behavior.	  	  Some	  of	  those	  prison	  rules	  attempt	  to	  control	  actual	  
criminal	   behavior	   during	   incarceration,	   while	   others	   attempt	   to	   foster	   activities	   intended	   to	  
rehabilitate	  inmates	  and	  reduce	  recidivism.	  
States	  began	  moving	  away	   from	  discretionary	  parole	   in	   the	  1980s	   toward	  a	   system	  of	  
determinate	  sentencing	  with	  mandatory	  supervised	  release.	  	  By	  1989	  eight	  states	  had	  abolished	  
discretionary	  parole;3	  in	  the	  1990s,	  another	  eight	  states	  abolished	  discretionary	  parole	  and	  four	  
other	   states	   abolished	   discretionary	   parole	   for	   certain	   violent	   crimes.	   	   Additionally,	   30	   states	  
have	   adopted	   truth-­‐in-­‐sentencing	   legislation,	   which	   reduces	   state	   parole	   board	   authority	   to	  
extent	  to	  which	  any	  discretion	  that	  remains	  may	  not	  be	  of	  sufficient	  magnitude	  to	  affect	  inmate	  
behavior.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  (Hughes,	  Wilson	  and	  Beck	  2001)	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This	   paper	   investigates	   whether	   the	   elimination	   of	   discretionary	   parole	   leads	   to	   a	  
change	   in	   inmate	   behavior:	   	   if	   inmates	   no	   longer	   are	   rewarded	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	   reduction	   in	  
sentence	  length	  for	  good	  behavior,	  are	  they	  less	  likely	  to	  behave	  well?	  	  Additionally,	  this	  paper	  
will	  attempt	  to	  determine	  which	  aspects	  of	  prison	  conditions	  affect	  inmate	  behavior.	  
The	  consensus	  of	   the	   sociological	   literature	  on	   the	   subject	  of	  prison	  violence	   suggests	  
that	   prison	   overcrowding	   is	   a	   central	   determinant	   of	   prison	   violence.	   	   This	   hypothesis	  will	   be	  
tested	  in	  this	  paper.	  
Data	  and	  Estimation	  
I	   perform	   a	   cross-­‐sectional	   study	   of	   the	   determinants	   of	   prison	  misconduct	   using	   the	  
1990	  Census	  of	  Adult	  Correctional	  Facilities	   at	   the	   institutional	   level,	  using	  measures	  of	  prison	  
conditions	  as	  the	  explanatory	  variables.	   	  There	  are	  1287	  adult	  correctional	  facilities	   in	  the	  U.S.	  
that	   are	   included	   1990	   Census	   of	   Adult	   Correctional	   Facilities.	   	   The	   number	   of	   inmates	  
incarcerated	  at	  these	  facilities	  ranges	  from	  less	  than	  10	  at	  a	  few	  small	  facilities	  to	  over	  5,000	  at	  
some	   large	   maximum-­‐security	   prisons.	   	   A	   potential	   problem	   of	   the	   data	   set	   is	   purposeful	  
reporting	  biases.	   	  Authorities	  at	  prison	  facilities	  may	  have	  an	   incentive	  to	  under-­‐report	   figures	  
such	   as	   assaults	   on	   guards	   and	   other	   inmates	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   bad	   publicity.	   	   Reports	   of	  
violence	  in	  prison	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  substantially	  understated.4	  
Empirical	  Specification	  
I	  model	  the	  number	  of	  assaults	  in	  a	  prison	  as	  a	  function	  of	  observable	  characteristics	  of	  a	  prison:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  "What	  gets	  reported	  is	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg,"	  said	  Cindy	  Struckman-­‐Johnson,	  professor	  of	  social	  
psychology	  at	  the	  University	  of	  South	  Dakota	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Prison	  Rape	  Elimination	  
Commission.	  	  Source:	  Study:	  Sex	  crimes	  in	  prisons	  underreported,	  USA	  Today,	  July	  30,	  2006.	  
	   46	  
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑆  𝑃𝐸𝑅  𝐺𝑈𝐴𝑅𝐷  ! = 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑠 + 𝛽!𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐸! + 𝛽!𝑀𝐴𝑋! + 𝛽!𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾! +𝛽!𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐸! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸! + 𝛽!𝐸𝐷𝑈! + 𝛽!𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃! + 𝛽!"𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃! + 𝜖!,	  
where	  ASSAULTS	  PER	  GUARD	  is	  the	  number	  of	  assaults	  on	  prison	  staff	  per	  correctional	  officer.	  
INMATES	  is	  the	  total	  number	  of	  inmates	  incarcerated	  at	  the	  facility,	  DECREE	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  
indicating	  whether	  the	  facility	  was	  under	  court	  order	  for	  overcrowding,	  MAX	  is	  the	  percentage	  
of	   inmates	  who	  are	  incarcerated	  under	  maximum	  security	  conditions,	  BLACK	  is	  the	  percentage	  
of	   inmates	  who	  are	  black,	  CONTRA	  is	  the	  number	  of	  contraband	  seizures	  per	   inmate,	  SPACE	  is	  
the	   confinement	   space	   in	   square	   feet	   of	   the	   prison	   cell,	   SUICIDE	   is	   the	   suicide	   rate	   among	  
inmates,	  EDU	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  inmates	  who	  are	  enrolled	  in	  basic	  education	  classes,	  OPEXP	  is	  
the	  operating	  expenditures	  per	  inmate,	  and	  CAPEXP	  is	  the	  capital	  expenditure	  per	  inmate.	  
Due	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   heteroscedasticity	   in	   the	   regression,	   Huber	   –	   White	   robust	  
standard	  errors	  were	  used.	  	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  use	  heteroscedasticity	  consistent	  covariance	  
matrix	  to	  estimate	  the	  standard	  errors.	  
Assaults	   per	   guard	   rather	   than	   the	   total	   assaults	  was	   used	   as	   the	   dependent	   variable	  
because	   of	   possible	   endogeneity	   problem	   associated	   with	   using	   the	   number	   of	   guards	   as	   an	  
independent	   variable	   and	   the	   level	   of	   assaults	   as	   the	   dependent	   variable.	   	  Using	   assaults	   per	  
guard	  will	  produce	  consistent	  parameter	  estimates.	  
Independent	  variables	  
The	  independent	  variables	  are	  indicators	  of	  prison	  conditions.	  
INMATES	  	  	  
This	  variable	  indicates	  the	  number	  of	  inmates,	  measures	  the	  size	  of	  the	  institution.	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DECREE	  	  
This	   variable	   indicates	   whether	   the	   institution	   is	   under	   a	   court	   order	   to	   reduce	  
overcrowding	  as	  of	  1990.	  	  Other	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  overcrowding	  leads	  to	  prison	  violence,	  
so	  the	  expected	  sign	  on	  this	  variable	  is	  positive5.	  
MAX	  	  
This	   variable	   is	   the	   percentage	   of	   inmates	   who	   are	   incarcerated	   under	   maximum-­‐
security	  conditions	  given	  that	  more	  violent	  offenders	  are	  housed	  in	  maximum	  security	  facilities.	  	  
This	   variable	   is	   likely	   either	   to	   lead	   to	   more	   assaults	   or	   more	   guards	   to	   control	   inmates’	  
behavior.	  
BLACK	  	  
This	  variable	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  inmates	  who	  are	  African-­‐American.	  	  
CONTRA	  	  
This	   variable	   is	   the	   number	   of	   seizures	   of	   contraband	   per	   institution-­‐inmate-­‐year.	  	  
Contraband	  seizures	  may	  affect	  staff	  assaults	  in	  two	  ways:	  	  (1)	  Contraband	  seizures	  involve	  close	  
contact	   between	   guards	   and	   inmates	   that	   create	   opportunities	   for	   assaults,	   and	   (2)	   access	   to	  
contraband,	  especially	  controlled	  substances,	  may	  play	  a	  large	  role	  in	  prison	  life.	  	  Limiting	  access	  
to	  contraband	  may	  result	  in	  inmate	  retribution	  against	  guards.	  
SPACE	  	  
This	  variable	  is	  the	  average	  confinement	  space	  per	  cell.	  	  Small	  confinement	  spaces	  may	  
have	  adverse	  psychological	  effects	  on	  inmates,	  making	  assaults	  more	  likely.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  (Elkland-­‐Olson	  1986)	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SUICIDE	  	  
This	  variable	  is	  the	  suicide	  rate	  among	  inmates,	  a	  possible	  indicator	  of	  overall	  conditions	  
at	  the	  facility.	  	  Poor	  conditions	  may	  lead	  to	  more	  assaults	  on	  guards.	  
EDU	  	  
This	  variable	  is	  the	  percent	  of	  inmates	  who	  are	  enrolled	  in	  basic	  education	  courses.	  	  This	  
variable	  is	  used	  to	  measure	  how	  interested	  inmates	  are	  in	  rehabilitation.	  	  If	  inmates	  are	  serious	  
about	  rehabilitation,	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  assault	  staff.	  
OPEXP	  	  
This	   variable	   is	   operating	   expenditure	   per	   inmate.	   	   Facilities	   with	   larger	   operating	  
expenditures	  may	   have	   amenities	   that	   inmates	   value,	   possibly	   affecting	   inmate	   behavior	   and	  
making	  it	  less	  likely	  that	  inmates	  assault	  staff.	  
CAPEX	  	  
This	   variable	   is	   capital	   expenditure	   per	   inmate,	   and	  may	   also	   be	   a	  measure	   of	   prison	  
amenities.	  
Results	  
One	   striking	   result	   is	   the	   magnitude	   of	   the	   contraband-­‐seizure	   coefficient.	   	   Each	  
contraband	   seizure	   is	   associated	   with	   an	   additional	   assault	   per	   guard	   and	   the	   coefficient	  
estimate	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  
The	   number	   of	   inmates	   is	   positively	   related	   to	   assaults	   per	   guard	   and	   the	   coefficient	  
estimate	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  	  There	  are	  multiple	  interpretations	  for	  such	  a	  result.	  	  One	  
interpretation	   is	  a	  size	  effect	  –	   larger	   facilities	  experience	  more	  assaults	  per	  guard.	   	  The	  other	  
interpretation	   is	   that	  the	  number	  of	   inmates	  could	  be	  an	   indicator	  variable	   for	  possible	  prison	  
overcrowding.	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Inmate	   participation	   in	   basic	   education	   is	   associated	   with	   fewer	   assaults	   on	   staff.	  	  
Participation	  in	  such	  programs	  may	  simply	  be	  a	  signal	  of	  an	  inmate's	  interest	  in	  rehabilitation,	  or	  
participation	  itself	  may	  act	  to	  reduce	  inmate	  misconduct.	  	  The	  coefficient	  estimate	  is	  significant	  
at	  the	  1%	  level.	  	  Whether	  a	  prison	  is	  under	  court	  order	  for	  overcrowding	  is	  unrelated	  to	  assaults	  
per	  guard.	  
The	   coefficient	   estimate	   on	   confinement	   space	   is	   negative,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   statistically	  
significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  	  The	  coefficient	  estimate	  on	  operating	  expenditures	  is	  negative,	  but	  
is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	   the	  10%	   level.	   	  Capital	  expenditure	  appears	   to	  be	  unrelated	  to	  
assaults	  per	  guard.	  
The	  percentage	  of	  inmates	  housed	  in	  maximum-­‐security	  conditions	  is	  positively	  related	  
to	   guard	   assaults,	   an	   unsurprising	   result	   given	   that	   repeat	   violent	   offenders	   occupy	   such	  
facilities.	  	  Racial	  composition	  of	  the	  prison	  is	  unrelated	  to	  on	  assaults	  on	  prison	  staff.	  
The	  coefficient	  estimate	  on	  the	  suicide	  rate	  is	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  
10%	  level	  suggesting	  that	  the	  suicide	  rate	  may	  be	  an	  indicator	  variable	  for	  unpleasant	  conditions	  
that	  may	  lead	  to	  assaults.	  
Conclusion	  
The	   analysis	   in	   this	   chapter	   suggests	   that	   are	   identifiable	   prison	   characteristics	   that	  
affect	  the	  number	  of	  assaults	  on	  staff	  per	  prison	  guard.	  	  Contraband	  seizures	  per	  inmate	  has	  a	  
very	  large	  positive	  effect	  on	  assaults,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  availability	  of	  contraband	  may	  have	  a	  
significant	  impact	  upon	  the	  perceived	  quality	  of	   life	  in	  prison.	  	  The	  suicide	  rate	  may	  also	  be	  an	  
indicator	  of	  prison	  conditions,	  as	   the	   suicide	   rate	  was	  positively	   related	   to	  assaults	  per	  guard.	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Additionally,	  participation	  in	  educational	  programs	  appears	  to	  be	  negatively	  related	  to	  assaults	  
per	  guard,	  suggesting	  that	  inmate	  rehabilitation	  may	  be	  possible.	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Table	  4.1	  	  Summary	  Statistics	  for	  1990	  Census	  of	  Adults	  Corr.	  Facilities,	  by	  Inmate	  Population	  
1287	  Observations	   	   	  
Variable	   Mean	   Standard	  Deviation	  
Assaults	  Per	  Guard	   0.0360	   0.0905	  
Inmates	   536.7	   740.8	  
Percent	  Maximum	  Security	   0.1172	   0.2648	  
Court	  Order	  for	  Overcrowding	   0.1445	   0.3518	  
Percent	  Black	   0.4101	   0.2589	  
Confinement	  Space	  (cell)	  [square	  feet]	   328.2	   1232.3	  
Percent	  Inmates	  Enrolled	  in	  Educational	  Program	   0.2568	   0.1618	  
Contraband	  Seizures	  Per	  Inmates	   0.0334	   0.0640	  
Suicide	  Rate	   0.0002	   0.0014	  
Operating	  Expenditure	  per	  Inmate	   15080.51	   16616.81	  
Capital	  Expenditure	  per	  Inmate	   1110.87	   8006.47	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Table	  4.2	  	  Assaults	  per	  Guard	  as	  Dependent	  Variable	  
Variable	   Coefficient	   Robust	  standard	  error	   t	  test	  statistic	   P-­‐value	  
Intercept	   0.00575060	   0.00345240	   1.67	   0.096	  
Inmates	   0.00000767	   0.00000291	   2.63	   0.009	  
Percent	  Maximum	  Security	   0.03087220	   0.01323380	   2.33	   0.020	  
Court	  Order	  for	  Overcrowding	   0.00277730	   0.00493570	   0.56	   0.574	  
Percent	  Black	   -­‐0.00446010	   0.00659350	   -­‐0.68	   0.499	  
Confinement	  Space	  (cell)	  [square	  feet]	   -­‐0.00000238	   0.00000162	   -­‐1.47	   0.143	  
Percent	  Inmates	  Enrolled	  in	  Educational	  Program	   -­‐0.04028570	   0.01479390	   -­‐2.72	   0.007	  
Contraband	  Seizures	  Per	  Inmates	   0.98147450	   0.10728110	   9.15	   0.000	  
Capital	  Expenditure	  per	  Inmate	   -­‐0.00000013	   0.00000020	   -­‐0.64	   0.520	  
Operating	  Expenditure	  per	  Inmate	   0.00000012	   0.00000009	   1.42	   0.155	  
Suicide	  Rate	   2.58087300	   1.52790900	   1.69	   0.091	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Number	  of	  observations	   1283	   	   	   	  
F(	  10,	  	  1272)	   19.88	   	   	   	  
Prob	  >	  F	   0.00000	   	   	   	  
R-­‐squared	   0.53470	   	   	   	  
Root	  MSE	   0.06197	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CHAPTER	  FIVE:	  	   CONCLUSION	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  dissertation	  would	  not	  surprise	  Adam	  Smith,	  who	  wrote:	  	  	  
“A	  prison	  is	  certainly	  more	  useful	  to	  the	  public	  than	  a	  palace;	  and	  
the	  person	  who	  founds	  the	  one	  is	  generally	  directed	  by	  a	  much	  juster	  spirit	  
of	  patriotism,	  than	  he	  who	  founds	  the	  other.	  But	  the	  immediate	  effects	  of	  
a	  prison,	  the	  confinement	  of	  the	  wretches	  shut	  up	  in	  it,	  are	  disagreeable;	  
and	   the	   imagination	   either	   does	   not	   take	   time	   to	   trace	   out	   the	   remote	  
ones,	  or	  sees	  them	  at	  too	  great	  a	  distance	  to	  be	  much	  affected	  by	  them.	  A	  
prison,	  therefore,	  will	  always	  be	  a	  disagreeable	  object;	  and	  the	  fitter	  it	  is	  
for	   the	   purpose	   for	   which	   it	   was	   intended,	   it	   will	   be	   the	   more	   so.”	  
[emphasis	  mine]	  
The	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  Sentiments	  (1759),	  p.	  35	  
	  
Despite	  being	  written	  nearly	  250	  years	  ago,	  Adam	  Smith’s	  analysis	  remains	  relevant	  to	  
public	  policy	  discussion	  today.	  	  Criminals	  appear	  to	  respond	  to	  how	  “disagreeable”	  prison	  
conditions	  are.	  	  Higher	  parole	  waiver	  rates	  in	  states	  with	  more	  prison	  amenities	  suggest	  that	  the	  
deterrent	  effect	  of	  prison	  may	  be	  mitigated	  by	  “nicer”	  facilities.	  	  Further	  evidence	  for	  this	  view	  
can	  be	  found	  from	  the	  result	  that	  long-­‐term	  crime	  rate	  difference	  across	  states	  may	  be	  
negatively	  related	  to	  indicators	  of	  disagreeable	  prison	  conditions	  across	  states.	  	  Additionally,	  I	  
found	  evidence	  that	  parole	  boards	  may	  have	  been	  “soft”	  on	  crime,	  but	  that	  judges	  were	  not.	  	  
The	  results	  from	  the	  last	  chapter	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  that	  prison	  conditions	  matter	  to	  inmates,	  as	  
	   54	  
inmates’	  behavior	  appears	  to	  worsen	  under	  more	  disagreeable	  prison	  conditions.	  Although	  
Smith’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  public	  interest	  is	  served	  through	  disagreeable	  prison	  may	  seem	  
barbaric	  to	  many,	  I	  found	  evidence	  to	  support	  this	  view.	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State-­‐by-­‐state	  summary	  of	  discretionary	  parole	  rules	  
State	   Discretion	   Comment	  
Alabama	   Yes	  
The	  Board	  cannot	  parole	  on	  life	  w/o	  parole	  or	  some	  other	  
sentences.	  
Alaska	   Yes	   	  
Arizona	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Only	  have	  discretion	  for	  those	  who	  committed	  an	  offense	  
prior	  to	  January	  1,	  1994.	  
Arkansas	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Only	  discretion	  for	  cases	  whose	  crimes	  were	  committed	  
prior	  to	  1994.	  
California	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Only	  had	  10	  paroled	  in	  1997,	  12	  in	  2000	  and	  in	  2001,	  
respectively.	  
Colorado	   Yes	  
Mandatory	  parole	  periods	  (up	  to	  5	  years)	  except	  certain	  sex	  
offenders	  who	  committed	  their	  crime	  after	  11/1/98,	  who	  
have	  lifetime	  supervision.	  Mandatory	  parole	  applies	  to	  all	  
inmates	  subsequent	  to	  1993,	  except	  sex	  offenders	  who	  are	  
discretionary.	  
Connecticut	   Yes	  
Inmates	  with	  sentences	  exceeding	  two	  years	  who	  have	  been	  
convicted	  of	  non-­‐capital	  felonies	  are	  eligible	  for	  parole.	  
Delaware	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Parole	  has	  been	  abolished	  for	  all	  those	  convicted	  individuals	  
who	  committed	  their	  crime	  after	  6/30/90.	  There	  are	  still	  
400	  persons	  in	  the	  system	  eligible	  for	  parole.	  The	  Board	  
recommends	  modification	  of	  sentences	  to	  sentencing	  courts	  
upon	  DOC	  application.	  The	  Board	  has	  authority	  over	  parole	  
and	  mandatory	  release	  violators.	  
Florida	   No,	  still	  some	  authority	  
Abolished	  parole	  in	  1983	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  
sentencing	  guidelines.	  The	  Board	  did	  retain	  paroling	  
authority	  over	  pre	  1983	  inmates.	  The	  Board	  still	  does	  
medical	  paroles,	  sets	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  supervision	  
for	  statutorily	  mandated	  released	  inmates.	  There	  were	  5961	  
parole	  eligible	  inmates	  in	  the	  system	  in	  1997.	  Effective	  
10/1/97	  the	  Board	  may	  order	  five	  year	  re-­‐interviews	  for	  
certain	  categories	  of	  inmates	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  two	  year	  
interview	  previously	  required.	  
Georgia	   Yes,	  limited	  
A	  1994	  law	  mandated	  a	  minimum	  10	  year	  prison	  sentence	  
on	  first	  conviction	  for	  anyone	  convicted	  of	  the	  7	  most	  
violent	  crimes.	  There	  is	  no	  parole	  for	  this	  group.	  The	  second	  
conviction	  of	  this	  type	  is	  a	  life	  sentence	  without	  parole.	  All	  
others	  are	  eligible	  for	  parole.	  Felony	  offenders	  convicted	  of	  
nay	  fourth	  felony	  are	  not	  eligible	  for	  parole.	  
	   60	  
Hawaii	   Yes	  
Court	  does	  impose	  mandatory	  minimum	  sentences	  at	  their	  
discretion	  for	  repeat	  offenders	  and	  those	  crimes	  which	  
under	  statute	  have	  mandatory	  minimum	  sentences	  
attached	  to	  the	  conviction.	  
Idaho	   Yes	   	  
Illinois	   No,	  with	  some	  authority	  
All	  individuals	  who	  committed	  a	  crime	  after	  2/1/78	  are	  on	  
determinate	  sentences.	  About	  480	  inmates	  in	  a	  prison	  
population	  in	  1997	  of	  40,000	  remained	  eligible	  for	  parole.	  
The	  Board	  is	  the	  paroling	  authority	  for	  juvenile	  offenders	  in	  
the	  system.	  For	  those	  inmates	  serving	  determinate	  
sentences	  the	  Board	  sets	  conditions	  of	  release,	  determines	  
when	  violators	  are	  to	  be	  returned	  to	  prison,	  screens	  and	  
makes	  recommendations	  for	  clemency	  petitions	  to	  the	  
Governor.	  
Indiana	   No	  
Discretionary	  parole	  was	  abolished	  in	  1977,	  but	  still	  have	  
parole	  supervision.	  Board	  may	  grant	  parole	  to	  offenders	  for	  
crimes	  committed	  prior	  to	  10/1/77	  and	  re-­‐parole	  those	  who	  
fall	  within	  this	  guideline.	  
Iowa	   Yes	   Life	  means	  natural	  life.	  	  
Kansas	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Individuals	  whose	  crimes	  were	  committed	  after	  7/1/93	  
receive	  a	  determinate	  sentence.	  
Kentucky	   Yes	  
Certain	  violent	  offenders	  must	  serve	  a	  minimum	  time	  
before	  eligible	  for	  parole.	  Deleted	  all	  forms	  of	  early	  parole	  
consideration	  except	  for	  medical	  paroles.	  Final	  discharges	  
from	  parole	  are	  no	  longer	  issued	  prior	  to	  reaching	  maximum	  
expiration	  date	  of	  sentence.	  Parole	  consideration	  for	  
defined	  violent	  offenders	  was	  increased	  from	  50%	  to	  85%.	  
Life	  without	  parole	  for	  capital	  offenses.	  Sex	  offenders	  
cannot	  be	  paroled	  until	  they	  have	  completed	  treatment.	  No	  
person	  who	  commits	  a	  certain	  specified	  offenses	  who	  was	  
armed	  or	  wore	  body	  armor	  can	  be	  paroled.	  
Louisiana	   Yes	   All	  crimes	  against	  person	  cannot	  be	  paroled.	  
Maine	   No	  
They	  abolished	  parole	  in	  1976	  and	  only	  a	  few	  cases	  that	  still	  
can	  be	  considered	  for	  parole.	  
Maryland	   Yes	  
Certain	  crimes	  of	  violence	  and	  repeat	  offenders	  are	  not	  
eligible	  for	  parole.	  
Massachusetts	   Yes	  
The	  Board	  has	  parole	  authority	  over	  all	  cases	  except	  a	  few	  
sex	  offenders	  who	  under	  an	  old	  law	  are	  not	  eligible.	  
Michigan	   Yes	  
Once	  the	  prisoner	  serves	  the	  minimum	  sentence	  less	  good	  
time,	  the	  Board	  has	  jurisdiction	  to	  parole.	  The	  Board	  may	  
now	  parole	  certain	  lifers	  sentenced	  for	  650	  grams	  or	  more	  
of	  cocaine	  after	  15	  to	  20	  years	  depending	  on	  other	  prior	  
convictions	  and	  cooperation	  with	  police.	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Minnesota	   No	  
Discretionary	  release	  programs	  are	  in	  jeopardy.	  Intensive	  
Community	  Supervision	  has	  been	  shut	  down	  and	  the	  
Challenge	  Incarceration	  Program	  and	  Work	  Release	  Program	  
have	  had	  their	  criteria	  significantly	  tightened.	  
Mississippi	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
The	  Board	  has	  discretion	  only	  if	  the	  crime	  was	  committed	  
prior	  to	  7/1/95.	  There	  were	  3715	  still	  in	  prison	  in	  1997	  
eligible	  for	  parole	  
Missouri	   Yes,	  with	  limits	  
Statutes	  restrict	  some	  cases	  from	  parole	  eligibility.	  The	  
offender	  must	  be	  sentenced	  under	  the	  specific	  statute	  
before	  restrictions	  apply.	  Drug	  trafficking	  first	  degree	  for	  
some	  methamphetamine	  offenders	  are	  no	  longer	  eligible	  
for	  parole.	  
Montana	   Yes	  
Lifers	  do	  have	  to	  serve	  a	  minimum	  time	  before	  they	  are	  
eligible	  for	  parole.	  
Nebraska	   Yes	  
Individuals	  are	  eligible	  for	  consideration	  after	  serving	  one-­‐
half	  of	  their	  minimum	  term.	  No	  such	  reduction	  of	  sentence	  
shall	  be	  applied	  to	  any	  term	  imposing	  a	  mandatory	  
minimum.	  
Nevada	   Yes	  
The	  Board	  has	  discretion	  until	  the	  last	  year	  of	  the	  prison	  
term	  then	  parole	  is	  mandatory.	  
New	  Hampshire	  	   Yes	   	  
New	  Jersey	   Yes	  
All	  inmates	  are	  eligible	  after	  serving	  1/3	  of	  their	  sentence	  
except	  life	  without	  parole	  for	  1st	  degree	  murder,	  and	  for	  
habitual	  offenders,	  whereby	  the	  sentencing	  judge	  can	  set	  
parole	  eligibility.	  
New	  Mexico	   Yes,	  with	  limits	   	  
New	  York	   Yes,	  new	  limits	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  inmates	  are	  serving	  indeterminate	  
sentences	  and	  subject	  to	  discretionary	  release.	  However,	  
second	  violent	  offenders	  get	  determinate	  sentences	  and	  are	  
not	  eligible	  for	  parole.	  A	  recent	  sentencing	  reform	  acts	  have	  
limited	  the	  Parole	  Board’s	  discretionary	  release	  authority.	  It	  
extended	  determinate	  sentencing	  to	  first	  time	  violent	  felony	  
offenders.	  Inmates	  with	  determinate	  sentences	  may	  be	  
conditionally	  released	  when	  6/7ths	  of	  the	  sentence	  has	  
been	  served.	  
North	  Carolina	   Yes,	  very	  limited	   Only	  on	  cases	  prior	  to	  4/10/94.	  
North	  Dakota	   Yes	   	  
Ohio	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
All	  sentenced	  for	  crimes	  committed	  after	  7/1/96	  are	  not	  
eligible	  for	  parole.	  The	  Board	  does	  set	  conditions	  for	  those	  
released	  on	  determinate	  sentences.	  The	  Board	  is	  
empowered	  to	  impose	  “bad	  time”	  for	  institutional	  rule	  
infractions	  that	  would	  be	  a	  criminal	  offense	  outside	  prison.	  
“Bad	  Time”	  extends	  the	  sentence	  imposed	  by	  the	  
sentencing	  court	  and	  may	  be	  imposed	  in	  increments	  of	  15,	  
30,	  60,	  90,	  days	  per	  infraction	  with	  accumulation	  not	  to	  
exceed	  half	  of	  the	  original	  determinate	  sentence.	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Oklahoma	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
The	  Board	  only	  recommends	  to	  the	  Governor,	  who	  is	  the	  
final	  releasing	  authority.	  Anyone	  committing	  certain	  violent	  
offenses	  on	  or	  after	  March	  1,	  2000	  will	  have	  to	  serve	  85%	  of	  
their	  sentence	  (generally	  offenders	  serve	  1/3	  )	  before	  parole	  
eligibility.	  
Oregon	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Only	  for	  crimes	  committed	  before	  1989.	  Only	  a	  small	  
number	  remain	  eligible.	  
Pennsylvania	   Yes	  
Offenders	  become	  eligible	  for	  parole	  at	  the	  expiration	  of	  
their	  minimum	  sentence.	  Offenders	  with	  sentences	  of	  less	  
than	  two	  years	  remain	  under	  the	  court’s	  jurisdiction.	  
Rhode	  Island	   Yes	  
All	  inmates	  are	  eligible	  after	  serving	  1/4	  of	  their	  sentences	  
except	  life	  without	  parole.	  The	  Board	  now	  has	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  sexual	  offender	  community	  notification.	  
The	  Board	  determines	  the	  risk	  level	  for	  re-­‐offense	  and	  
carries	  out	  community	  notification	  with	  local	  police.	  
South	  Carolina	   Yes,	  some	  limits	  
Discretionary	  parole	  was	  abolished	  for	  certain	  crimes	  
sentenced	  to	  20	  years	  or	  more	  committed	  after	  1/1996.	  
South	  Dakota	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Only	  inmates	  who	  committed	  their	  crime	  prior	  to	  7/1/96	  are	  
eligible	  
Tennessee	   Yes,	  limited	  
There	  is	  no	  parole	  for	  a	  person	  who	  committed	  a	  crime	  
against	  persons	  offense	  on	  or	  after	  7/1/95.	  Others	  must	  
serve	  a	  minimum	  time	  before	  they	  are	  eligible.	  
Texas	   Yes	  
The	  board	  has	  authority	  over	  who	  is	  released	  on	  parole	  or	  
discretionary	  mandatory	  supervision,	  conditions	  of	  
supervision,	  and	  revocation.	  They	  also	  make	  executive	  
clemency	  recommendation	  to	  the	  Governor.	  
Utah	   Yes	  
Life	  without	  parole	  and	  death	  sentences	  that	  are	  commuted	  
shall	  have	  life	  without	  parole.	  
Vermont	   Yes	   	  
Virginia	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Only	  those	  who	  committed	  a	  crime	  prior	  to	  the	  1995	  
abolishment	  of	  parole	  are	  eligible.	  
Washington	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
Parole	  was	  abolished	  in	  1984.	  Only	  those	  who	  committed	  a	  
crime	  prior	  to	  1984	  are	  still	  eligible	  and	  in	  1997	  about	  700	  
were	  still	  in	  the	  system.	  
West	  Virginia	   Yes	  
Must	  see	  everyone	  yearly,	  except	  lifers	  who	  can	  be	  given	  a	  
three	  year	  set-­‐off.	  
Wisconsin	   Yes,	  very	  limited	  
The	  truth	  and	  sentencing	  law	  that	  took	  effect	  in	  January	  of	  
2000	  eliminated	  parole	  for	  individuals	  arrested	  after	  that	  
date.	  Anyone	  sentenced	  to	  less	  than	  one	  year	  is	  eligible.	  The	  
Board	  still	  has	  authority	  over	  old	  code	  cases.	  
Wyoming	   Yes	  
Inmates	  must	  serve	  a	  minimum	  before	  paroled.	  Cannot	  
parole	  lifers.	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